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Private Enforcement of Federal
Statutes: The Role of the Section
1983 Remedy
By PAUL WARTELLE* AND JEFFREY HADLEY LOUDEN**
Introduction
In Maine v. Thiboutot,' the Supreme Court gave 42 U.S.C. section
1983 an interpretation that, for the first time in the section's 110-year
history,2 matched the breadth of its literal language.3 The Court in
Thiboutot held that the phrase "and laws" in section 1983 means ex-
actly that. Violation of rights created by any federal statute, not only
rights created by statutes involving equal rights, gives rise to an action
under section 1983.
4
There was irony in the Court's decision. The judicial conservatism
of the late nineteenth century had rendered section 1983 a dead letter
for almost a century after its passage as a remedial provision of the
Reconstruction era Civil Rights Acts.' The activist Warren Court re-
* Staff attorney with the San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation.
B.S.F.S., 1972, Georgetown University; J.D., 1976, Case Western Reserve University.
** B.A., 1978, University of California, Berkeley; member, third year class. Mr.
Louden would like to express his appreciation for the refreshing analysis of these issues
provided by Professor Wayne Brazil at Hastings College of the Law.
1. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
2. For two excellent discussions of the history of § 1983, see generally Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1323, 1323-36, (1952); Devel-
opmentsin the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1135-89 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Section 1983 and Federalism].
3. Section 1983 provides, "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution andlaws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added).
4. 448 U.S. at 4-8. See generally Jennings, Statutorily Based Federal Rights: 4 New
Rolefor Section 1983, 14 J. MAR. 547 (1981). The remedy provided by the Court for statu-
tory violations under § 1983 will be referred to hereinafter as "the Thiboutot remedy."
5. The Court's early interpretations of the provision appeared to limit its application to
statutory and constitutional claims related to racial discrimination. See, e.g., Holt v. Indi-
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vived the section as a remedy for state and local governmental abuse of
constitutional rights during the "second reconstruction" of the 1960's.6
Paradoxically, however, the renewed dominance of judicial conservati-
vism under the Burger Court has coincided with the real unshackling of
the section.7 This process has been capped by Thiboutot's affirmation
of a literal interpretation of section 1983-an interpretation that seems
to have placed the section at the center of federal statutory, as well as
constitutional, jurisprudence.
There may prove to be further irony, however, in the apparent
grandeur of the new role Thiboutot gives section 1983. Federal statu-
tory jurisprudence is in a state of extraordinary flux. In the same term
as Thiboutot, the Court also announced Transamerica Mortgage Adyi-
sors v. Lewis.9 Transamerica, and the earlier decision of Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington,' ° virtually eliminated the implied right of action, the
traditional doctrinal basis for litigation under statutes that do not them-
selves expressly provide a private judicial remedy.II The relation be-
tween this rejection and the recognition of section 1983 as a remedy for
ana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900). Limitation on the scope of the section limited its invoca-
tion, and in the first 50 years after its enactment, only 21 cases were decided under § 1983.
Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Czwil Remedy?, 26 IND.
L.J. 361, 363 (1951). In 1960, 280 suits were filed under all of the civil rights acts combined.
Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 2, at 1172. See generally Jennings, supra note 4, at
549; Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1953).
6. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-87 (1961), the Court held that the "color of
state law" provisions of the statute could be satisfied by official action that was not explicitly
authorized by statute. In the same decision, however, the Court held that municipalities
were not persons within the meaning of § 1983 and therefore could not be liable under it.
Id at 191.
7. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (common law immu-
nity for discretionary functions provides no basis for immunity under § 1983); Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities are persons within the
meaning of § 1983); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (§ 1983 applies to
property rights).
8. By 1972, approximately 8000 suits were filed annually under § 1983 alone. McCor-
mack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Protections (pt. 1), 60 VA. L. Rav. 1, 1 n.2 (1974). By 1977, the number had topped 13,000,
where it has remained. (This number does not include prisoner petitions filed under § 1983.)
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 27 n.16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Jen-
nings, supra note 4, at 549.
9. 444 U.*. 11 (1980). For recent discussions of Transamerica and its effects, see gener-
ally Frankle, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553 (1981); Note, Implied Causes of
Action: A New Analytical Framework, 14 J. MAR. 141 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Implied Causes of Action].
10. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
11. Several cases in the Court's most recent term have reiterated the Court's rejection of
the implied right of action. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (198 1); see also
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Texas Industries
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
[Vol. 9:487
Spring 19821 1983: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
violations of federal statutes is unclear. On the one hand, Thiboutot
raised the possibility that section 1983 will emerge as an alternative to
the implied right of action where statutes are violated under color of
state law. On the other hand, the implied right cases were spurred by a
view of the judicial role that condemns supplementation of congres-
sionally provided remedies. 2 Such supplementation, some members of
the Court believe, is illegitimate usurpation of the legislative function.13
This ambivalence toward the statutory cause of action may undermine
the Court's resolve to provide a remedy for governmental violations of
statutory rights under section 1983, thus rendering the bold promise of
the Thiboutot decision illusory.
In two cases decided in the Court's last term, Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman 4 and Middlesex County Sewerage Au-
thority v.. National Sea Clammers Association, 5 the Court began the
work of reconciling Thiboutot and Transamerica. The results were
mixed. Both cases reaffirmed Thiboutot's reading of section 1983 as a
remedy for statutory violations.16 Each case, however, created limits
on the availability of the remedy that were potentially quite restrictive.
Pennhurst raised the underlying question of how statutory rights are
created in the first place, asserting that the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 7 created no enforceable rights and
thus could not furnish grounds for an action under section 1983.18 Sea
Clammers focused on the interaction of the section 1983 remedy with
those contained in substantive statutes.' 9 The Court found that the
existence of an explicitly provided remedy may preclude resort to sec-
tion 1983 as an alternative. Taken together, the two cases seem to indi-
cate that the Court will be reluctant to give wide scope to the section
1983 remedy for statutory violations. This reluctance seems strongly
12. See notes 326-30 and accompanying text infra. See generally Note, A New Direction
for Implied Causes ofAction, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 505 (1980).
13. See generally Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-716 (1979).
14. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
15. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
16. In both cases the Court raised the § 1983 issue on its own accord. The plaintiffs in
each had proceeded on an implied right of action theory. This conjunction of the two theo-
ries of relief may have colored the Court's consideration of the Thiboutot issues.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6080 (1978).
18. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 18-19.
19. In his dissent in Thiboutot, Justice Powell, citing Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 150-51 (1970), and Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 422 U.S. 366 (1979),
suggested that remedies provided in substantive statutes would limit the scope of § 1983.
448 U.S. at 22 n. II (Powell, J., dissenting).
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influenced by the Court's analysis of the implied right of action issue.20
This article examines the scope of the Thiboutot remedy in the
wake of Pennhurst and Sea Clammers. Part I reviews the background
of the Court's rejection of the implied right of action. Part II examines
the historical context and legislative history of section 1983 and the
reasoning behind the Court's recognition of the broad scope of that
section in Thiboutot. The focus of Part III is the Court's attempts in
Pennhurst and Sea Clammers to reconcile the implied right of action
approach to statutory litigation with Thiboutot. Part IV suggests that
the Pennhurst and Sea Clammers decisions erred in their failure to con-
sider the historical and the institutional factors that distinguish the
Thiboutot remedy from the implied right of action. These factors, it is
argued in Part V, require that the Court's consideration of the
Thiboutot remedy be guided by a presumption in favor of its
availability.
I. Conceptual Background
Thiboutot and the implied right of action cases address the same
question: Whether or not a private individual may judicially enforce
federal statutes when the statute itself does not explicitly provide the
cause of action asserted. They approach the question from different
perspectives, however. Section 1983 serves only as a remedy for action
under color of state law; the implied right of action applies to any vio-
lation of statutory rights.2 ' The Supreme Court has yet to distinguish
the answers provided by each of the remedies to the cause of action
question. There is precedent, however, for suggesting that the focus of
the Thiboutot remedy on governmental action should lead to a separate
and more liberal standard of review.22
For most of this century, two threshold issues have determined
whether or not private statutory enforcement actions will lie: standing
and the implied right of action doctrine.2 3 Although no explicit stan-
20. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 10-
11.
21. For an excellent discussion of the cause of action issue, see generally Albert, Stand-
ing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83
YALE L.J. 425 (1974).
22. See note 110 infra.
23. It is perhaps indicative of the uncertainty with which the federal courts approach
statutory litigation that such a basic issue as who may enforce a statute is unsettled after 200
years of federal jurisprudence. The federal courts did not have jurisdiction over federal
questions at all until the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in 1875. The federal regulatory net is
primarily the product of legislation in this century. Professor Albert points out that the lack
[Vol. 9:487
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dard governed the relation between them, a rough division of the types
of cases to which each doctrine applied,24 reflecting the historical ori-
gins of the two doctrines, prevailed. 5 The standing doctrine, with its
roots in constitutional and administrative law, determined whether or
not the conduct of governmental entities would receive judicial re-
view.26 The implied right of action doctrine, which developed out of
the law of torts, was applied when the action sought redress of a specific
injury resulting from a statutory violation.2 7 The implied right of ac-
tion generally involved private conduct.
2 8
of the writs of mandamus and certiorari on the federal level inhibited the development of a
public or statutory law tradition. Albert, supra note 21, at 433.
24. This rough division reflects the distinction between actions against governmental
entities or public officials and those against private individuals, a distinction which would
logically seem to be one of the most basic in statutory jurisprudence. Although the emer-
gence of the Thiboutot remedy may now force an articulated recognition of the distinction,
hitherto the courts have made the public-private distinction sub silentio, if at all. The mud-
dling of the two is one of the most disturbing aspects of the Court's restriction of the private
right of action in National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passen-
gers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 (1974). See notes 69-112 and accompanying text infra. Justice Jack-
son pointedly described the confusion. "The painfully logical French. . . recognized from
the beginning that controversies between the citizen and an official, in the performance of
his duty as he saw it, involved some different elements and considerations than the contest
between two private citizens over private matters. . . . But the United States and England
have backed into the whole problem rather than face it." R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 46 (1955).
25. For comparisons of the two doctrines, see Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake
& Ohio R.R., 475 F.2d 325, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger
Corp. (Amtrak) v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Albert, supra
note 21; Comment, Private Rights ofAction Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implicationsfor
Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1408-11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Private
Rights ofAction].
26. Professor Jaffe, who has traced the origins of the standing doctrine in the English
courts, finds its roots in the writ of mandamus. He quotes Lord Mansfield's broad descrip-
tion of the writ. "It was introduced, to prevent disorder from a failure of justice, and defect
of police. Therefore it ought to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no
specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one." L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 462 (1965) (citing Rex v. Barker, 3
Burr. 1265, 1267, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 824-25 (K.B. 1762)). In the 18th century, this broad
judicial power was limited in the English courts by a requirement that the one seeking issu-
ance of the writ allege violation of a legal interest. L. JAFFE, supra at 463-64 (citing The
King and Queen v. St. John's College, 87 Eng. Rep. 366 (K.B. 1693)). Similarly, standing
developed in the American system as a restraint on the Court's exercise of its power of
constitutional review, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), or on its review of ad-
ministrative agency action, Edmund Hines Yellow Pine Trustee V. United States, 263 U.S.
143 (1923). The requirement was phrased in terms of sufficient adversity of interest to sat-
isfy the requirement of article III that courts decide cases or controversies. See L. JAFFE,
supra, at chs. 12-13.
27. See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).
28. See notes 326-30 and accompanying text infra.
Snfin , 1982] . 1983: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
This unstated balance between the standing and the implied right
doctrines has not been sustained, however, as the concepts have
evolved beyond their historical antecedents. Recent restrictions on the
implied right of action doctrine have upset the balance completely. In
the process, much of the conduct of state and local governments in ad-
ministering federal programs has been rendered virtually unreviewable
in the federal courts, unless such review is authorized by the Thiboutot
remedy. A brief historical survey will indicate how this has occurred.
A. The Common Law Approach
The growth of the federal legislative role first raised the statutory
cause of action issue in the early part of this century. The Supreme
Court's natural response was to approach the question in the familiar
terms of the common law.29 Notions of legal interest rooted in the
common law thus became a point of departure in shaping both the im-
plied right of action doctrine and the standing doctrine.
The early implied right of action was essentially a federal doctrine
of negligence per se 3° -the federal statute created the duty and stan-
dard of care. The Court implied a damage remedy on behalf of in-
tended beneficiaries of the statute who had been injured as a result of
its violation. The decision of Texas & Pacfic Railway v. Rigsby,31 in
which the Court provided a damage action for a brakeman injured by a
railroad's failure to install a handrail required by the Federal Appli-
ance Safety Act, typified this approach. Since the statute contained an
explicit standard of conduct but not a remedy, the Court implied the
latter based on the former. This statutory tort approach to implication
proved so broad that in a number of cases the Court simply refused to
follow it, relying instead on legislative history or statutory construction
of the underlying statute to show that Congress had not intended to
29. See note 26 supra. See generally Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Re-
view: A Remote Relationsh4,, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 1139, 1149-55 (1977).
30. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). As Justice Stevens pointed out in
his dissent in Sea Clammers, the doctrine is also rooted in the maxim of jurisprudence, ubi
jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy). Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 23 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 520, 527 (1874) ("a general liability created by statute
without a remedy may be enforced by appropriate common-law action"); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("it is a general and indisputable rule, that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded").
31. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
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provide a private right of action.32 The cases rejecting application of
the doctrine, however, provided no alternative standard for implication
and met with strong dissent and thus no coherent alternative was able
to replace the common law approach. 3
Despite the constitutional basis of the standing doctrine, common
law principles also shaped its early development. It was to the common
law that the Court looked to define the class of adversity of interests
that would satisfy the article III requirement of a case or controversy.
34
As Justice Frankfurter put it, the standing inquiry was a determination
of whether or not the question presented was "consonant with what
was, generally speaking, the business of the colonial courts and the
courts of Westminster when the constitution was framed. ' '35 This
search for interests cognizable at common law led the Court to deny
standing in a series of cases brought by business enterprises to chal-
lenge competition from publicly owned companies, since competitive
injury was not recognized at common law.36 For similar reasons, the
Court refused to recognize actions by taxpayers seeking to assert the
public interest 37 and actions by individuals seeking to assert the rights
of third parties.38 No such interests had been recognized at common
law; therefore, the parties were not truly adverse. Another line of
standing cases decided during the same period did recognize nontradi-
tional interests where the underlying statute demonstrated a clear pro-
tective intent.39 This standard was applied exclusively where the statute
explicitly provided for private enforcement actions. The two standards
interacted, however, when the Court, influenced by a common law in-
difference to certain kinds of injury, declined to infer a protective pur-
pose from legal constraint or governmental authority even where such
a purpose was apparent.4°
32. For early restrictive applications of the doctrine, see T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,
359 U.S. 464 (1959); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); Montana-
Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
33. See generally Note, Implied Causes of Action, supra note 9.
34. See note 26 supra.
35. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
36. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
37. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
38. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
39. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
40. E.g., Perkins v. Lukens, 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Berry v. Housing & Home Fin., 340
F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965). See Albert, supra note 29.
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B. The Functional Approach
Professor Davis and other scholars were critical of the Court's reli-
ance on common law definitions of injury in the standing determina-
tion, charging that the common law approach shielded many of the
fundamental conflicts that characterize modem industrial democracy
from judicial scrutiny.41 Under this pressure, analysis of both the im-
plied right and standing issues shifted in the 1960's and early 1970's
toward greater emphasis on the purposes of the statute under which
rights were asserted. In Association of Data Processing Service Organi-
zations, Inc. v. Camp4 2 and Barlow v. Collins,43 the Court formulated
what might be termed a "functional approach" to the standing ques-
tion. This approach focused on the need for a judicial remedy to give
practical effect to Congress' remedial purpose. The Court, following
this view, shaped its own judicial role to fit the overall purpose of the
particular statute.
In Association of Data Processing, commercial sellers of data
processing services challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of Currency
that allowed national banks to make data processing services available
to other banks. The lower court dismissed this suit for lack of standing
since it was based on competitive injury.' The Supreme Court re-
versed. Noting that the plaintiffs had alleged injury in fact to their eco-
nomic interest, the Court rejected the legally protected interest
requirement of Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TA .45 Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, stated:
The "legal interest" test goes to the merits. The question of
standing is different. It concerns, apart from the "case" or "con-
troversy" test, the question whether the interest sought to be pro-
tected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar-
antee in question.46
In addition, section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 196247
prohibited bank service corporations from engaging in any activity
other than the performance of bank services for banks. The Court held
41. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 208-94 (1958); Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 450 (1970); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public
Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Piaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
42. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
43. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
44. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.
1969).
45. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
46. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153.
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976).
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that this combination of injury in fact and protective legislative pur-
pose created standing by arguably bringing competition within the
zone of interests protected by the statute.48
Justice Douglas based a third element of the Data Processing test
for standing on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).49 The APA
provides that review of agency action will be permitted except where
the statute precludes review or where the action is committed to agency
discretion." Citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,5" Justice Douglas
rejected a "presumption against judicial review and in favor of admin-
istrative absolutism."52 There was no evidence, he said, that the Na-
tional Bank Act sought to preclude judicial review; therefore, those
within a class of "aggrieved" persons under the terms of the Act were
entitled to review. 3
A similar approach was adopted in Barlow v. Collins.54 In Barlow,
tenant farmers sought to challenge regulations by the Secretary of Agri-
culture permitting assignment of farm subsidy payments as unauthor-
ized by the Food and Agriculture Act. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit denied the farmers standing on the grounds that they had
neither alleged a legally protected interest nor alleged any provision of
the Food and Agriculture Act that expressly or impliedly granted
standing.55 Justice Douglas, again writing for the Court, reversed, de-
claring that tenant farmers were within the zone of interests protected
by the Act since the legislative history indicated "a congressional intent
to benefit the tenants. 56
A functional viewpoint also influenced the Court's rationale for
48. 397 U.S. at 153-54.
49. Id at 157.
50. See note 112 infra.
51. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
52. 397 U.S. at 157.
53. Id
54. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
55. 398 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1968).
56. 397 U.S. at 164-65. In his concurring opinion, id at 167-78, Justice Brennan argued
that by incorporating the zone of interests test into the standing inquiry, Douglas had con-
fused the standing question with issues that involve the merits. Brennan suggested an alter-
native framework that might have avoided much subsequent confusion. The standing issue,
he said, should turn simply on the extent of the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Questions
regarding the zone of interests protected by the statute relate to a second preliminary issue,
reviewability. Reviewability, he indicated, "has ordinarily been inferred from evidence that
Congress intended the plaintiffs class to be a beneficiary of the statute under which the
plaintiff raises his claim." Id at 174 (Brennan, J., concurring). If these threshold tests are
satisfied, the Court, in Justice Brennan's scheme, would then proceed to the merits, deter-
mining whether or not the plaintiff was actually injured by agency conduct violative of the
statutory standard.
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the implied right of action doctrine. In J Case Co. v. Borak,57 an
action by stockholders seeking relief for violation of the proxy provi-
sions of the Securities and Exchange Act, the Court reaffirmed the need
for judicial interpretation of the consequences of violating federally
created rights.58 As an additional justification for implication, the
Court pointed to the beneficial role that recognition of a private action
could play in the achievement of the policy goals sought by Congress
through the passage of the Act.5 9 Noting the volume of proxy state-
ments received by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
each year, the Court declared that this volume placed a burden on the
SEC's enforcement capacity that did not permit an independent exami-
nation of the material set forth in each statement. The Court con-
cluded that if Congress' original legislative goal was to be achieved,
and if unlawful manipulation was to be prevented, implication of a
private cause of action was a "necessity."6
C. The New Formalism
L Standing
Warth v. Seldin6' signaled a fundamental change in the Court's
approach to litigant access questions, shifting the method used from
functionalism to a self-conscious concern with the Court's own institu-
tional role. In the ensuing era, the Court would focus on the letter
rather than on the purpose of the legislation, interpreting and exercis-
ing its power with a strict concern for the formal distinctions between
legislative and judicial roles.62 In Warth, the Court denied standing to
lower-income and minority individuals and associations, to municipal
taxpayers, and to a group of developers who sought to challenge the
restrictive zoning policies of the town of Penfield, New York.63 The
Court found that the injuries alleged by each plaintiff were too indirect
57. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
58. Id at 433.
59. Id at 432-33.
60. Id at 432-35. In Borak, Justice Clark caught the spirit of the functionalist approach
to the role of the judiciary in statutory enforcement. Commenting on the administrative
burden on the SEC he said, "We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it is
the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose." Id at 433.
61. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
62. In a sense, formalism is simply the functionalist tune in a different key. Both ap-
proaches define the judicial role on the basis of the perceived place of courts in the political
process and in the governmental system rather than on the basis of the received tradition of
the common law. The formalist approach is distinguished from the functionalist approach,
however, by a political preception more wary of the positive role of government.
63. 422 U.S. at 507.
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or impersonal,6 were not sufficiently likely to be remedied by a
favorable decision,65 or were, in fact, injurious to a third party.
66
Therefore, none of the plaintiffs' injuries constituted an appropriate ba-
sis for standing to challenge the municipality's zoning practices.67 The
Court admitted that the standing criteria it applied were not constitu-
tionally required, declaring that the concept of standing was not solely
a constitutional question but also embodied prudential concerns. The
Court said:
Without such [prudential] limitations-closely related to Article
III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance-
the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of
wide public significance even though other governmental institu-
tions may be more competent to address the questions and even
though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect indi-
vidual rights.68
2. The Implied Right ofAction: From Amtrak to Transamerica
The Court's concern in Warth with judicial self-governance car-
ried over into its consideration of the implied right of action issue. This
concern was expressed by a new formalism in the Court's interpretation
of congressional intent.
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. NationalAssocia-
tion of Railroad Passengers,69 the Court refused to imply a cause of
action on behalf of an association of passengers who sought to chal-
lenge Amtrak's termination of lines that were deemed uneconomic.
The Court said that Congress had not intended to provide a private
remedy under the Rail Passenger Service Act.70 The Court inAmtrak
took a different approach to the question of congressional intent than
had the Court in Borak. Instead of inquiring into the policy goals of
Congress and seeking the means to further them, the Court tried to
determine whether or not Congress had intended to allow private en-
forcement actions.71 The Act did provide for a cause of action by the
Attorney General, but an amendment offered in committee that would
64. Id
65. Id at 504; see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
66. 422 U.S. at 502.
67. Id at 501. Compare Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), with Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
68. 422 U.S. at 500. See generally Yarbrough, Litigant Access Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 31 VAND. L. REv. 33 (1978).
69. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See Comment, Private Rights of Action, supra note 25.
70. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1976).
71. Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 457.
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have permitted action by an aggrieved party had been rejected. The
Court interpreted this rejection by the committee as a congressional
rejection of implied private actions.72
The enforcement power of the Attorney General provided another
link in the Court's reasoning. Resurrecting the ancient maxim of statu-
tory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alteriuts,73 the Court de-
clared that the grant of express enforcement power to the Attorney
General indicated a congressional intent to preclude a supplementary
private cause of action.74
Finally, the Court considered the overall purpose of the Act itself
and found support for its decision not to permit an implied remedy. It
argued that the legislative purpose that it discerned in the Act-the
rapid and economical consolidation of the nation's rail passenger sys-
tem-would be hampered, not furthered, by private litigation.75 Con-
gress, in the Court's view, had thus chosen to bar private actions in
order to facilitate the swift and efficient implementation of its policy
goals.
a. The Cort Test
In Cort v. Ash,7 6 the Court retreated from the emphasis given in
Amtrak to the congressional remedial intent. Acknowledging the
anomaly of searching for a congressional will regarding remedial pro-
cedures for which Congress had failed to provide explicitly,7 7 the Court
created a four-point test for determining whether or not a particular
statute would support an implied private remedy. The factors deemed
relevant were: (1) Is the plaintiff of a class for whose special benefit
72. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976).
73. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." This maxim has been subject
to severe criticism. As one court put it in a context unrelated to implication, "The doctrine
expressio unius est excluslo alterius is at best an unreliable basis for ascertaining intention. Its
premise is that the draftsman has made a comprehensive review of all possible related provi-
sions, from which the inference is to be drawn that his silence indicates a discriminating
judgment of rejection. Such a conclusion usually is unrealistic, for it assumes too much
foresight in the draftsman." Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716,
719 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See also H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROB-
LEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1173-74 (temp. ed. 1958).
74. 414 U.S. at 458. But see Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
75. 414 U.S. at 462.
76. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
77. Id. at 82-83. The Court emphasized the need to concentrate on the actual legislative
history. See id at 82 n.14, where the Court said, "[Iln situations in which it is clear that
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an inten-
tion to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such a cause of
action would be controlling."
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the statute was enacted-that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff?78 (2) Are there any indications of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one?79 (3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? 0 (4) Is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law in an area basically the
concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause
of action based solely on federal law?81 Although initially greeted by
some commentators as the death knell of the implied right of action,
82
the Cort test has proven to be a flexible standard8 3 that has often been
successfully invoked by plaintiffs seeking judicial recognition of im-
plicit statutory action.84
Several members of the Court have found the Cort test too flex-
ible. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 5 the majority relied on Cort
to imply a cause of action under Title IX, section 901(a) of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972,86 for a university job applicant discrimi-
nated against on the basis of sex.87 Justice Powell commented harshly
in dissent on the amenability of Cort to successful implication:
In the four years since we decided Cart, no less than 20 decisions
by the Courts of Appeals have implied private actions from fed-
eral statutes. . . . It defies reason to believe that in each of these
statutes Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended
private action. Indeed, the accelerating trend evidenced by these
decisions attests to the need to reexamine the Cort analysis. 8
Justice Powell also condemned the entire concept of judicial implica-
tion as an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative function by courts.
78. 422 U.S. at 78 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
79. 422 U.S. at 78 (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974)).
80. 422 U.S. at 78 (citing Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,
423 (1975)).
81. 422 U.S. at 78 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)).
82. Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal
Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1978).
83. Note, Implied Causes ofAction, supra note 9, at 156.
84. For a partial listing of cases that found an implied right of action under the Cort
test, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 741-42 (1979) (Powell, J.
dissenting).
85. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
86. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1972).
87. The majority, following Cort, analyzed each of the four factors that decision had
suggested for determining whether or not a cause of action should be implied. Writing for
the Court, Justice Stevens indicated that all four factors weighed on the side of permitting a
private action on behalf of the Cannon plaintiff. 441 U.S. at 688.
88. Id at 741 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Reliance on judicial implication, he argued, allowed Congress to duck
hard political issues raised by enforcement questions:
Because the courts are free to reach a result different from that
which the normal play of political forces would have produced,
the intended beneficiaries of the legislation are unable to ensure
the full measure of protection their need may warrant. For the
same reason, those subject to the legislative constraints are de-
nied the opportunity to forestall through the political process po-
tentially unnecessary and disruptive litigation.89
Implication of a cause of action, Justice Powell argued, should never be
allowed unless there appears to be compelling evidence of a legislative
intent that private enforcement be permitted.90
b. Rejection of the Cori Test
Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon bore fruit in Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington9' and in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.92
These cases deemphasized the Cort test and evidenced a return to a
more exclusive reliance on the congressional intent analysis that had
been the Court's rationale for the Amtrak decision.
In Touche Ross, trustees in bankruptcy sought an action under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 193.493 against accountants for a securi-
ties broker who had filed false reports with the SEC. The Court re-
jected the implication of a private cause of action. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, specifically condemned the tort theory of impli-
cation, declaring that the implied right of action rested solely on statu-
tory interpretation 94 and that this statutory interpretation should seek
only congressional intent;95 the Cort factors themselves were merely
useful as guides in determining whether or not Congress intended to
provide a private remedy.96 The Court concluded that Congress had
not intended a private remedy. Pointing to the administrative relief
provided by the Act, the Court stated that it would be extremely reluc-
tant to provide a remedy broader than that chosen by Congress.9 7
Transamerica involved an action by shareholders of a real estate
investment trust for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in violation of
89. Id at 743.
90. Id at 749.
91. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
92. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
94. 442 U.S. at 568-69.
95. Id at 571.
96. Id at 575.
97. Id at 579.
[Vol. 9:487
§ 1983: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.98 The Court held that the Act
permitted a limited remedy of recission but that the Act would not sup-
port any implied remedy.
A comparison of the Transamerica and Amtrak decisions reveals
the Court's increasing reliance on formal maxims for determination of
the implication question.99 Each decision placed congressional intent
at the center of its determination of whether or not to permit an implied
action. In Amtrak, the Court had a significant basis for arguing that
Congress had formulated an intent with respect to private enforcement
actions. Both the legislative history and analysis of the policy goals
underlying the Rail Passenger Service Act gave some support to the
view that Congress had intended the enforcement mechanism it actu-
ally created to be exclusive. In Amtrak, in other words, there was sub-
stantial reason to believe that the exfpressio unius maxim matched
Congress' actual intent. In contrast, the Court in Transamerica found
no legislative history to indicate that Congress had any intent one way
or another regarding implied actions when it passed the Investment
Advisors Act in 19 40 ,100 nor did the Court argue that the substantive
purpose of the Act-the protection of investors from fraudulent prac-
tices-would be hindered by permitting defrauded clients to sue their
investment advisors for damages. 10 Instead, the rationale for the
Court's decision that the Act provided no implied action for damages
was simply that the legislation created only administrative and criminal
sanctions.1 0 2 Invoking exfpressio unius est exclusio aiterius, the Court
reasoned that Congress must have intended these remedies to be
exclusive.
D. Standing and the Implied Right of Action
As long as the roots of the standing and implied action doctrines in
article III and tort law, respectively, remained firm, the two doctrines
were relatively easy to distinguish. 03 As the common law tradition has
been subordinated, however, first to functional and then to prudential
98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-5 (1976).
99. Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 563-70 (1981).
100. Justice Stewart admitted that the legislative history was entirely silent on private
rights of action. 444 U.S. at 18.
101. Justice White in dissent pointed out that the Court's admission that a recission rem-
edy under the Act could be implied was a finding that the Act did permit an implied right of
action. The Court's refusal to permit a damage action as well as one for recission, he said,
stemmed from its confusion of the cause of action issue with the question of relief. Id at 25
(White, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 19-20.
103. See notes 25 & 56 supra.
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considerations, distinguishing the two doctrines has become more diffi-
cult."°4 At the same time, the significance of the distinction has become
greater. Despite Warth, standing remains, as it must, a test that plain-
tiffs can meet. After Transamerica, on the other hand, the burden a
plaintiff must carry in order that a court will imply a private action
may be so heavy as to be almost impossible.
A secondary aspect of theAmtrak case has therefore assumed par-
amount importance. The court of appeals' decision in Amtrak was not
framed in terms of the implied right question at all. 05 BecauseAmtrak
was a quasi-public corporation operating under statutory authority, the
court of appeals found that the standing inquiry was appropriate in
determining whether or not the parties were properly before the
court.10 6 The Supreme Court did not reject the application of the
standing doctrine in Amtrak, but ruled simply that the question of
whether or not an action may be implied must be resolved first. When
no right of action exists, the Court said, "questions of standing and
jurisdiction become immaterial."107 The effect of this switch in the rea-
soning process is to reverse the presumption regarding the Court's
power to review agency action. Although the third part of the Data
Processing test for standing addressed the issue of congressional intent
with respect to judicial review,' 8 it followed Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner'019 in establishing a presumption of reviewability. 10 Amtrak,
104. See notes 25 & 62 supra. Compare Justice Brennan's relatively clear discussion of
the distinctions in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-78 (1970), with his tortured analysis
in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-41 (1979).
105. Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
106. Id at 330.
107. Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 456. See Pillai, supra note 82, at 6.
108. See note 56 supra.
109. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See note 46 and accompanying text supra. Judge Skelly
Wright, in the court of appeals decision in Amtrak, had dealt with the issues of the legisla-
tive history, the purpose of the Rail Passenger Service Act and the attorney general's remedy
in standing terms. Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). The effect of the Abbott Laboratory presumption of reviewability was telling.
Reviewing the legislative history, Judge Wright pointed to sections of the Act that explicitly
prohibited judicial review. "Where Congress intended to preclude judicial review it knew
very well how to make its wishes clear." Id at 336. Turning to the legislative purpose, he
acknowledged that it included the swift elimination of uneconomic railway lines. He noted,
however, that the purpose was also the preservation of the rail passenger system. Achieve-
ment of this goal required compliance with the Act, and "judicial review of Amtrak's actions
is necessary if compliance is to be assured." Id at 337. He also considered the effect of the
Act's explicit remedies. Rejecting the logic of expressio unius, he declared, "Since we can
explain the express provision of standing in the Attorney General, employees and employee
representatives on grounds unrelated to any congressional intent to preclude other injured
and aggrieved parties from bringing suit, we cannot reasonably infer from the statutory
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by contrast, required a positive showing that Congress intended review
through a private right of action. In light of the restrictive formalism of
subsequent decisions, Amtrak's assertion of the pre-eminence of the
implied right test amounts to an elimination of the right to judicial re-
view where it is not explicitly provided by statute.1 '
This transposition of issues has led to an institutional anomaly.
Federal legislation has increasingly delegated responsibility for the ad-
ministration of federally authorized social and regulatory programs to
state and local governments. Such legislation seldom provides explic-
itly for judicial review, yet courts have generally granted such review
upon a showing of the plaintiffs standing. A symmetry between the
state and federal governments thus has been preserved with the review-
ability of federally administered programs under the APA.11 2 The pre-
eminence of the right of action question over the standing question es-
tablished in Amtrak and the rigid views the Court has adopted regard-
ing the implied right of action, however, suggest that federally
authorized programs administered by the states may suddenly be
shielded from judicial scrutiny.
This is the doctrinal dilemma that gives Thiboutot's interpretation
of section 1983 its significance. An expansive interpretation of that
language an intent to bar other parties from bringing suit, especially in light of the strong
presumption in favor of review with which we began our analysis." Id at 334.
110. The following cases, for example, involved review under the Social Security Act:
Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978); Van Lare v.
Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528 (1974); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535 (1972); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971);
California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1967); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). Review has also been routinely per-
mitted under the National Housing Act of 1937. Thorpe v. Durham Hous. Auth., 393 U.S.
268 (1969); Chicago Hous. Tenants Ass'n v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 512 F.2d 19 (7th Cir.
1975); Fletcher v. Hous. Auth., 491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Hous. Auth., 471 F.2d
63 (7th Cir. 1972).
Ill. See, e.g., CETA Workers' Org. Comm. v. City of New York, 617 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.
1980) (no implied action under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1978);
Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1979) (no implied action under the Na-
tional Housing Act of 1937); Perry v. Housing Auth., 486 F. Supp. 498 (D.S.C. 1980) (no
implied action under the National Housing Act of 1937).
112. The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), is a general remedial statute that functions very
much like § 1983. It does not itself provide jurisdiction for statutory claims against federal
agencies; instead, it provides the cause of action upon which jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1976) may be based. Where a cause of action exists under the APA, an implied right
of action under the substantive statute is unnecessary. Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663
F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
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statute would preserve the symmetry with respect to judicial review be-
tween federally and locally administered programs.
II. Section 1983 and the Statutory Cause of Action
A. Legislative History: An Overview
Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Reconstruction
era legislation, which brought a fundamental shift in the balance of
power between the federal and state governments within the United
States governmental system.' 1 3 Prior to the Civil War, the Court em-
braced concepts of federalism that emphasized states' rights and fears
of a powerful central government. The first ten amendments to the
Constitution were thus concerned with limiting the action of the federal
government but not the action of either states or individuals. The Civil
War changed these views.
The victory of the Union armies, the infamy of secession, and the
aftermath of the war during Reconstruction discredited the prior theo-
ries of federalism. The national government was now viewed not as a
threat to individual rights but as a protector of those rights against in-
fringement by state or private action. The Reconstruction Congress,
controlled by abolitionists with strong federalist and nationalist tenden-
cies, maneuvered the national government into a key position in pro-
viding for and defending the welfare of the individual. This new role
for the national government was most evident in the area of civil rights.
During the Reconstruction years, Congress passed the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution as well as
five major civil rights acts implementing those amendments. 1 4 The
three amendments created a structure of national citizenship with
broad new guarantees of liberty and equality. The Civil Rights Acts
refined these amendments and contained jurisdictional provisions that
conferred primary responsibility for the vindication of these rights on
the federal judiciary. "As a result of these and other acts the lower
federal courts emerged from the Reconstruction period with signifi-
cantly greater importance, supplanting the state courts as the principal
113. See generally Gressman, supra note 2, at 1323-36; Section 1983 and Federalism,
supra note 2, at 1135-89.
114. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibiting racial discrimination in public
accommodations); Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (suppressing the Ku Klux Klan);
Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 443 (protecting voting rights); Act of May 31, 1870, ch.
14, 16 Stat. 140 (protecting voting rights); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing
southern black codes).
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forum for enforcing federal law.""' 5 The original version of section
1983 was part of this restructuring of federalism and of the role of the
federal judiciary.
The language of section 1983 is very broad." 6 Perhaps for this
reason, judicial interpretation of the section has relied heavily on exe-
gesis of its legislative history." 7 Unfortunately, the legislative history
on whether or not the section extends its protection to statutorily cre-
ated rights is fragmentary and susceptible to contradictory characteri-
zations." 8 The language defining the scope of the statute underwent
numerous changes over the years, none of which received substantial
comment in Congress.
The original version of section 1983 was section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the Ku Klux Klan Act." 9 That statute was broadly
directed at the violence and official persecution visited on emancipated
blacks and on republicans in the Reconstruction South by the Klan and
its sympathizers.' 20 It created civil causes of action for violations of
citizens' rights and provided jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear
115. Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 2, at 1142.
116. See note 3 supra (quoting § 1983).
117. See, e.g., Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 2, at 1137. But see Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), which gives the legislative history little attention, stating, "One
conclusion which emerges clearly is that the legislative history does not permit a definitive
answer." Id at 7.
118. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S 600, 623, 646, 672
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (White, J., concurring) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The debate
over the meaning of the legislative history apparently reached a point of bitter disagreement
for Justice Powell, who, in reference to the "ambiguities, contradictions, and uncertainties"
that Justice White found in the history, stated, "These confusions, however, are for the most
part not inherent in the legislative history. With all deference, it seems to me they are
largely the product of [Justice White's] opinion concurring in the judgment." Id at 640 n.24
(Powell, J., concurring).
119. The first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 reads as follows: "That any person
who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State,
shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the
United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the
several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of
appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under
the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled 'An
act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of
their vindication;' and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature
applicable in such cases." Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
120. See Gressman, supra note 2, at 1334; Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 2, at
1153-56.
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such cases,'2 1 regardless of the amount in controversy.122 The remedial
provisions it created extended to violations of rights, privileges, and
immunities "secured by the Constitution," but did not explicitly refer
to statutory rights as being among those protected.
In 1866, Congress authorized a comprehensive revision and
recodification of all federal statutes,'2 3 an undertaking that was not
completed until the enactment of the Revised Statutes in 1874.124 Most
of the civil rights legislation was enacted in the interim and was in-
cluded in the revision. z2 The revision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
wrought numerous significant changes.'
2 6
The language of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act was expanded to
encompass rights secured by the "Constitution and laws."' 127 The re-
vised language is identical to what is presently codified at 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. The revision also separated the remedial provision of sec-
tion 1 from its jurisdictional provision.12 8 When the revisers made this
separation, they created three jurisdictional provisions: one for the fed-
121. As noted in text accompanying note 115, supra, this jurisdictional grant was part of
a larger scheme by the Republican Congress to entrust protection of the Reconstruction
program to federal, not state, courts. See Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 2, at 1152-
53.
122. Neither the 1871 Civil Rights Act nor the 1866 Act, incorporated therein by refer-
ence, included a jurisdictional amount requirement for these actions.
123. Revision of Statutes Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74.
124. Revision of Statutes Act of 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat. 113.
125. One notable exception, the Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, was passed
after the revision.
126. The most significant changes in the Civil Rights Acts appeared in § 1 of the 1871
Act and in various criminal provisions of the 1870 Act. Prior to the revision, § 6 of the 1870
Act had been singularly expansive in its scope because it criminalized private as well as
color-of-law conspiracies to deprive persons of either their federal constitutional or statutory
rights. During the revision, however, § 17 of the 1870 Act, previously covering only statutory
violations, was given expansive language to parallel that in § 6. Thus, the revised version of
§ 17 embraces, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "all of the Constitution and all of the
laws of the United States." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966) (emphasis in
original). This expansion of § 6 of the 1870 Act closely parallels the expansion of § 1 of the
1871 Act. See generally Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 653-58
(White, J., concurring).
127. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress." Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III
1979)).
128. This separation of provisions by function was part of a carefully considered "sys-
tematic plan of a more minute topical arrangement" on the part of the revisers. 2 CONG.
REc. 827 (1874) (comments of Rep. Lawrence).
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eral district courts, one for what were then called the federal circuit
courts,129 and one for the Supreme Court. This development intro-
duced an element of irremediable ambiguity into the legislative history
of section 1983 because the three jurisdictional provisions contain con-
siderably different language. Although both the district and circuit
courts were courts of original jurisdiction, the scope of their authority,
stemming from section 1 as revised, differed. Revised Statute section
563(12) granted the district courts jurisdiction over claims arising out of
violations of rights "secured by the Constitution of the United States or
of any right secured by any law of the United States."' 3° Revised Stat-
ute section 629(16), on the other hand, limited jurisdiction in the circuit
courts to suits alleging violations of constitutional rights "or of any
right secured by any law providing for equal rights."13 Last, Revised
Statute section 699(4) authorized review in the Supreme Court of
"[a]ny final judgment. . . in any case brought on account of the depri-
vation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States, or of any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States." The reasons for these differences in language are not
clear. 132  When Congress reorganized the federal judiciary in 1911,
however, it consolidated the two lower federal court jurisdictional pro-
visions into what is presently 28 U.S.C. section 1343(3), 13 3 a statute
129. The federal circuit courts, not to be confused with the Circuit Courts of Appeals,
were a tier of trial courts created under the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73.
These circuit courts had significant original jurisdiction as well as appellate jurisdiction.
Their function in the federal judicial system was continually problematic and they were
eventually abolished in the Judicial Code of 1911. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
1087. See text accompanying notes 237-41 infra. The modem-day circuit courts of appeals
were created in the Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See
generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 32-41 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER].
130. Subparagraph 12 of Rev. Stat. § 563 (1878) authorized district court jurisdiction
"[o]f all suits at law or in equity authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress
the deprivation, under color of any law, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States
or of any right secured by any law of the United States to persons within the jurisdiction
thereof."
131. Subparagraph 16 of Rev. Stat. § 629 (1878) granted the circuit courts original juris-
diction "[o]f a R suits authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the depriva-
tion, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, of
any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any
right secured by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
132. See text accompanying notes 237-43 infra.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. III 1979) provides, "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person...
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which adopted the more restrictive language of the circuit court
provision.
134
B. Pre-Thiboutot Judicial Interpretation
In reference to the Civil Rights Acts of the Reconstruction era,
Professor Tribe states, "The Supreme Court restrictively construed or
simply invalidated much of this legislation, acting to preserve in law
the autonomy that the states had largely lost politically in the wake of
the Civil War."'135 Restrictive interpretation of section 1983 reflected
similarly severe limits on the Fourteenth Amendment,136 a process that
the Court had begun even before the revisers presented the 1874
recodification to Congress. In The Slaughter-House Cases,137 decided
in 1873, the Supreme Court heard a Fourteenth Amendment challenge
to a monopoly on slaughterhouses. The plaintiffs alleged that the mo-
nopoly, created by the City of New Orleans, violated their right to la-
bor freely--one of the privileges and immunities they claimed to be
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 138 The Court rejected
the claim, finding that the privileges and immunities clause protected
only those rights inherent in national citizenship. In the Court's view,
fundamental civil rights such as those alleged by the plaintiffs adhered
only to state citizenship and were not comprehended by the Fourteenth
(3) [t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
134. The choice of this more restrictive language for § 1343(3) is most likely explained by
the conservative political climate of the post-Reconstruction era. "Following its initial flurry
of legislation, Congress, reflecting the changed political climate of the post-Reconstruction
era, ceased for three quarters of a century its efforts to enforce the Civil War amendments."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 257 (1978).
135. Id. at 257 (footnotes omitted).
136. See Gressman, supra note 2, at 1336-39.
137. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
138. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment contains the "privileges and immu-
nities clause." "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment allowed Congress to enforce the Amendment "by appropriate legislation.".
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was such legislation and, in-
deed, was officially titled "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." Thus, "the construction
there given the privileges and immunities clause went to the very constitutional heart of
those statutes." Gressman, supra note 2 at 1337.
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Amendment.' 39 Significantly, however, in defining the rights attendant
to national citizenship, the Court included those rights which "owe
their existence to the federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws."' 4° The Court's reference to the Constitution
and laws in defining national citizenship echoed similar language in an
earlier case expounding the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution.'
4 '
Subsequent decisions directly limited section 1983,142 requiring
that deprivation under color of state law be strictly pleaded, 43 that
state action be narrowly defined,'14 and that the term "secured" be nar-
rowly defined. 45 The first case to consider the scope of the term "and
laws," Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co. ,146 stated that section 1983
was limited to violations of civil rights. The actual holding of the case,
however, rested solely on the interpretation of Revised Statute section
629(16), the jurisdictional grant to the circuit courts that limited juris-
diction to violations of equal rights. 47 The Court provided nothing
more than a bare assertion of the proposition, however, stating that
sections 1983 and 629(16) "refer to civil rights only and are inapplica-
ble here."' 48 The Holt view received some subsequent approval in
Hague v. CIO, 149 when Justice Stone, in an influential concurring opin-
ion, suggested that section 1983 protected personal, not property,
rights.' 50 Holt, however, cannot be considered authority for a general
limitation on the scope of section 1983, and has been distinguished as a
139. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 75-79.
140. Id at 79.
141. "[T]he privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several
States, by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which are common
to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being
citizens." Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869), citedin The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76-77.
142. See Section 1983 and Federaism,supra note 2, at 1156-67; Note, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1419-20 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Welfare Challenges].
143. See, e.g., Huntington v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 441 (1904); Barney v. City of
New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
144. See, e.g., Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Devine v. Los
Angeles, 202 U.S. 313 (1906).
145. See, e.g., Chrystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 177 U.S. 169 (1900);
Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 115 U.S. 611 (1885); Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317
(1885).
146. 176 U.S. 68 (1900).
147. Id at 71.
148. Id at 72.
149. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
150. Id at 531 (Stone, J., concurring).
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case of federal deference to state taxation powers.' 5'
The growing volume of legislation involving federal-state coopera-
tion in economic and social fields has caused a number of lower federal
courts in recent decades to reconsider the Holt interpretation of section
1983.152 The Social Security Act (SSA), Is3 the oldest and largest fed-
eral-state cooperative program, produced the bulk of this litigation.1
54
Indeed, a number of landmark Supreme Court decisions involving the
SSA were jurisdictionally inexplicable without a right of action under
section 1983.155 The Court seemed to stray from this line of precedent,
however, in Chapman v. Houston Wefare Rights Organization .156 The
plaintiff in Chapman sought to premise jurisdiction on section 1343(3)
over a section 1983 claim that alleged a violation of the SSA.15 7 Reaf-
firming Holt, the Court held that section 1343(3) conferred federal ju-
risdiction only over claims based on statutes securing "equal rights."
The Court concluded that the SSA was not such a statute and therefore
claims for violation of the SSA would have to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirements of 42 U.S.C. section 1331.158 Unlike the Holt de-
151. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), cited in Note, Welfare
Challenges, supra note 142, at 1419 n.118.
152. See, e.g., Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 835-38 (4th Cir. 1974) (§ 1983 applicable to
Social Security Act); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 579 (5th Cir.
1969) (§ 1983 applicable to Wagner-Payser Act of 1933); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 440 F.
Supp. 904, 908-10 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (§ 1983 applicable to Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
154. Countervailing tensions between the welfare objectives of the federal government
and the concerns of local governments administering the SSA may account for why the Act
has been a source of so much § 1983 litigation. The federal government, on the one hand,
may seek certain general goals through the program, one of which includes relatively uni-
form national application. Local administering governments, on the other hand, may have
particular moral and fiscal priorities that set them apart from the typical recipient as con-
templated by the federal government. Such tensions are bound to occur more frequently
with fundamental social welfare legislation like the SSA than with legislation affecting less
essential values. See generally Note, Wefare Challenges, supra note 142.
155. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 132 n.13 (1979) (state foster care program incon-
sistent with SSA); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 729 & n.3 (1978) (state emergency assist-
ance program consistent with SSA); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975) (state shelter
allowance provisions inconsistent with SSA); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (state
prohibition against AFDC aid for college students inconsistent with SSA); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 311 (1968) (state cohabitation prohibition inconsistent with SSA). Cf. Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 532-33, 543 (1974) (district court had jurisdiction to decide whether
state recoupment provision consistent with SSA); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 670 (1972)
(district court had jurisdiction to decide whether state absent-spouse rule consistent with
SSA).
156. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
157. See note 133 supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 160-61 infra.
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cision, however, the Chapman decision explicitly left open the question
of whether or not the "and laws" language of section 1983 afforded a
remedy for statutory violations. In a foreshadowing of later develop-
ments, Justices Powell and White entered into an animated debate of
the tangential section 1983 issue in their concurring opinions in
Chapman. 1
9
C. Judicial Interpretation in Maine v. Thiboutot
The issue reserved in Chapman came up for decision a year later
in Thiboutot. The jurisdictional amount requirements 60 of Chapman
posed a substantial barrier to statutorily based section 1983 claims in
federal courts.16' Section 1331, however, poses no barrier to section
1983 litigation in state courts.' 62 It was in this context, reviewing the
application of a federal remedy in a state forum, that the United States
Supreme Court received its first opportunity to rule directly on the
scope of the statutorily based section 1983 remedy.
The claim of Lionel Thiboutot presented a classic instance of the
deprivation of a federal right under color of state law. 163 The Maine
Department of Human Services changed its method of calculating in-
come available to families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), and as a result reduced its AFDC grant to Mr.
Thiboutot's chilidren." 6  The state claimed that its decision was re-
159. See note 118 supra.
160. At the time Chapman was decided, § 1331 had a jurisdictional amount requirement
of $10,000. See note 161 infra.
161. Welfare claims and other statutorily based claims rarely exceed $10,000. Moreover,
the Burger Court has restricted class actions so that each member of a class, whether or not a
named party, must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973). The net effect of Chapman was thus to restrict severely statutorily
based § 1983 claims in federal courts. See Note, Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 Does
Not Include Statutorily Based Claims of Wefare Rights Deprivation- Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization, 29 DE PAUL L. REv. 883, 900 (1980); Jennings, supra note 4, at
557-59.
162. Five months after the decision in Thiboutot, Congress resolved the anomaly of a
federal right unenforcible in a federal forum by eliminating the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486,
§ 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. III 1979)). This amendment
should greatly increase the availability of federal forums for § 1983 actions. For a discus-
sion of these developments, see Jennings, supra note 4, at 558-59.
163. See Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
164. Mr. Thiboutot and his wife had eight children, three of whom were Mr. Thiboutot's
by a previous marriage. The Maine Department of Human Services notified Mr. Thiboutot
that in calculating the AFDC benefits for the three children it would no longer take into
account the money he spent to support the other five children, even though he was legally
obligated to support them.
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quired by new federal regulations. 65 Mr. Thiboutot filed an adminis-
trative challenge to the determination, and when it was denied filed a
challenge in state court to the agency's interpretation of the regulation.
An amended complaint added a claim under section 1983.166 The trial
court found for the Thiboutots, ordering the state to adopt new regula-
tions and to pay retroactive benefits. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine upheld the decision and also ordered the state to pay attorney's
fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976.167 The
state appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the attorney's
fees award and on the cognizability of the SSA claim under section
1983.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, cut through the confu-
sion of the legislative history by simply dismissing it as irrelevant. The
plain language of the statute, he stated, does not require resort to the
legislative history for its interpretation. 68 Section 1983 protects rights
"secured by the Constitution and laws," and Congress attached no
modifier to the term "laws."' 169 Justice Brennan drew support for his
reading of the language from dicta contained in earlier section 1983
cases. In Greenwood v. Peacock,170 he observed, the Court had stated
that state officers may be held liable "not only for violations of rights
conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other
constitutional and statutory rights as well."'17 1 Similar statements were
made in Mitchum v. Foster172 and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 173
Justice Brennan also drew on the Court's implicit reliance on section
165. The regulation at issue was 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976).
166. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 & n.7 (1980), held that state courts are
allowed to entertain § 1983 actions.
167. Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979). The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), states: "In any action or proceeding to enforce
a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law
92-318, or in any civil action or proceedings, by or on behalf of the United States of
America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal
Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs."
168. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6 (1980). Justice Brennan stated, "Where the plain
language, supported by consistent judicial interpretation, is as strong as it is here, ordinarily
'it is not necessary to look beyond the words of the statute."' Id at 6 n.4 (quoting TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978)).
169. 448 U.S. at 4, 7.
170. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
171. Id at 829-30.
172. 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972), cited in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5.
173. 405 U.S. 538, 543 (1972), cited in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5.
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1983 in King v. Smith 74 and Rosado v. Wyman1 75 for support in his
reading of the section.
176
Justice Brennan felt that the legislative history was ambiguous,
stating, "[O]ne conclusion which emerges clearly is that the legislative
history does not permit a definitive answer."'177 He cited Justice Pow-
ell's concurrence in Chapman for the proposition that a principal pur-
pose behind the addition of the "and laws" language had been to bring
federal equal rights law within the section's ambit.178 "On the other
hand," he asserted, "there are no indications that that was the only
purpose." 179 The principle of statutory interpretation upon which Jus-
tice Brennan seems to have relied may be summarized as follows:
Where the literal language of a statute is consistent with prior judicial
interpretation, legislative history that is not clearly contradictory may
be disregarded and Congress may be taken at its word. 1 0 On this basis,
Justice Brennan approved the section 1983 statutory cause of action." 1
Justice Powell's dissent vigorously condemned the majority's dis-
regard of legislative history and its incaution in policy-making. The
majority, he claimed, had "almost casually"' 2 proclaimed a landmark
decision on a basic question of federalism.8 3
Justice Powell criticized as simplistic Justice Brennan's reliance on
plain meaning and his rejection of the legislative history.18 4 Quoting
with irony from Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 115 he reminded the
Court that the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes "'must be given
174. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
175. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
176. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4, 6-7.
177. Id at 7.
178. Id (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 637 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
179. Id
180. Essentially, this is the same philosophy of statutory interpretation employed by the
Court in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), and earlier in Exparte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61
(1949), and cases cited therein. Ironically, the majority in 'V.4 v. Hill undertook a substan-
tial analysis of the legislative history of the Act in issue, but did so, in the Court's words,
"only to meet Mr. Justice Powell's suggestion that the 'absurd' result reached in this case, is
not in accord with congressional intent." 437 U.S. at 184 n.29 (citation omitted). The ma-
jority in 7hiboutot, however, was not as obliging to Justice Powell, even though in Justice
Powell's dissent in 7hiboutot he suggests that the result reached by the majority is "idiotic."
448 U.S. at 21 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 11.
182. Id at 11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
183. Id at 12. The question of federalism in issue is the extent of liability under § 1983 of
state and local officials.
184. Ird at 13-14.
185. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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the meaning and sweep' dictated by 'their origins and language'-not
their language alone."18 6 Justice Powell's own analysis of the legisla-
tive history, as originally set out in his concurrence in Chapman, led
him to conclude that the unmodified phrase "and laws" in section 1983
was basically an "inadvertent" error, 18 7 and that Congress really meant
the section to be read exactly as Revised Statute section 629(16) and
later 42 U.S.C. section 1343 are read-to encompass only laws provid-
ing for equal rights.188 Only such a reading, he argued, avoids the "idi-
otic"'189 result that section 1983 should have a broader scope than
section 1343, its jurisdictional counterpart. To buttress this interpreta-
tion, Justice Powell cited various references in the legislative history
which emphasized that the revisers were not to alter the meaning of the
statutes as they revised them. 190 In Justice Powell's view, the majority's
interpretation of the meaning of "and laws" was a substantial depar-
ture from the provision's earlier meaning and thus was not within the
intended purview of the revision. 19 1 Further, the majority interpreta-
tion created a wide gap between the coverage of section 1983 and sec-
tion 1343(3)-sections that were intended to be coextensive.192
The majority's decision, Justice Powell argued, was unwise as well
as erroneous. It opened up the floodgates for litigation, seeking to hold
states liable for their conduct of the ever increasing number of federal-
state cooperative programs. 193 Such litigation would harass state offi-
cials and overburden the courts. 194 Such a sweeping change in the fed-
eral-state relationship, Justice Powell felt, could not have passed
through the Forty-third Congress without debate and therefore could
not have been the intended consequence of the recodification of section
1983.195
186. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 14 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 405 U.S. at 549).
187. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
188. Id at 17-19.
189. Id at 21 n.9 (citing Cover, Establishing Federal Jurisdiction in Actions Brought to
Vindicate Statutory (Federal) Rights When No Violations of ConstitutionalRights are Aleged,
2 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 5, 25 (1969)).
190. 448 U.S. at 17-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
191. Id at 22 (Powell, J., dissenting).
192. Id at 20.
193. Id at 22-23.
194. Id at 23.
195. See text accompanying notes 229-30 infra.
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Ill. The Thibomtot Decision: A Critique
Whatever one may think of the Court's result in Thiboutot, it is
difficult not to find, along with Justice Powell, an air of casualness in
the Court's reasoning. Thiboutot is a landmark decision on the federal-
state relation,1 9 6 making section 1983 a linchpin in federal statutory, as
well as constitutional, jurisprudence; yet the Court addresses neither
the historical justification nor the policy rationale for suddenly granting
such a role to this 110 year-old statute. 197 As a result, Justice Powell's
shrewdly argued dissent has had a telling effect. The puzzle is why the
majority left so much unsaid in defense of its own position.1
9 8
A. The Legislative History of § 1983 Revisited
However much Justice Powell may mock the dictates of the
"meaning and sweep" and the "origins and language" of the Civil
Rights Acts, 199 the fact remains that this legislation was enacted as part
of a fundamental reconstruction of the federal system.2 °0 Changing no-
tions of federalism after the Civil War emphasized a strong federal
government. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
created rights in national citizenship, and the Civil Rights Acts asserted
a strong role for the federal judiciary in protecting those rights.
20'
Section 1983 grew out of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
which in turn was passed pursuant to the newly enacted Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 2 While the 1871 version of the provision did not con-
tain the words "and laws," Justice Powell's assertion that these words
could only have appeared in the 1874 revision through inadvertence
appears patently false. The Slaughter-House Cases of the year prior to
196. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), observed
that the issues raised under § 1983 concern "a basic problem of American federalism" that
"has significance approximating constitutional dimension." Id at 222 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
197. Justice Powell points out this defect. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 12, 33 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
198. Undoubtedly, the majority in Thiboutot was a fragile coalition because it included
not only Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and White, all of whom had adopted a similar
interpretation of § 1983 a year earlier in Chapman, but also Justices Stevens and Blackmun
who had declined to do so. It is likely that Justice Brennan had to restrict the focus of the
opinion in order to obtain the support of Justices Stevens and Blackmun.
199. See text accompanying note 186 supra. In light of the restrictive meaning Justice
Powell gives to these dictates, his invocation of them can be little more than a mockery.
200. See text accompanying notes 113-16 supra.
201. The Supreme Court has recognized that a major purpose of the Civil Rights Acts
was to "involve the federal judiciary" in protecting a "federal right in federal courts." Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1973).
202. See text accompanying notes 116-22 supra.
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the recodification constituted the first judicial interpretation of the
"rights, privileges and immunities" language of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 °3 This language had been incorporated exactly into sec-
tion 1 of the 1871 Act.z ' The Court in Slaughter-House, a decision
that seemed at the time to narrow the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, °5 defined the source of the federal rights, privileges, and immu-
nities that constitute national citizenship as being the Constitution,
federal laws, and the structure of federal government. 0 6
All of the individuals to whom Congress entrusted the revision of
the statutes, including the commissioners on the two committees and
the Hon. Thomas J. Durant who did the final redraft, were selected for
their standing in the legal profession.20 7 It is far more plausible to
think that the revisers intended to incorporate the Slaughter-House lan-
guage2 8 in their definition of rights, privileges, and immunities than it
is to presume that they were careless. Indeed, Thomas J. Durant him-
self successfully argued the Slaughter-House Cases on behalf of the de-
fendants during the drafting of the revision.20 9
Justice Powell, in his analysis of the legislative history, makes a
great deal of the margin note that the drafters appended to section
629(16).21o That note itself, however, expressed the drafters' concern
that restrictive judicial interpretation should not limit the authorized
remedial provisions simply to constitutional rights. "Every right se-
cured by a law authorized by the constitution" should find its remedy
203. See text accompanying notes 137-41 supra.
204. See note 119 supra.
205. See L. TRIBE, supra note 134, at 406-07; Gressman, supra note 2, at 1337-39.
206. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
207. This is emphasized throughout the Congressional Record, as the following examples
illustrate. "[T]he act of Congress of June 27, 1866, authorized the appointment of three per-
sons, learned in the law ... . The commissioners, whose revision in two volumes is now
before us, and Mr. Durant, whose work is also here. . . have all certainly displayed great
learning, ability and skill in this very difficult and herculean labor assigned them." 2 CONG.
REC. 825-26 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Lawrence). "[Tlhe Committee on Revision of the Laws
employed Mr. Durant, a lawyer of eminence in this city, to go over this revision." 2 CONG.
REc. 646 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Poland, chairman of the Comm. on the Revision of the
Laws). "[A] commission of competent gentlemen, carefully selected for the work, have for
three years been engaged in it, availing themselves of the labors of their predecessors." 2
CONG. Rmc. 648 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Hoar).
208. Slaughter-House, and its precursor, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 8 (Wall.) 168, 180
(1869), both refer to the "Constitution and laws" in defining the privileges and immunities
of citizenship, language which, of course, was incorporated into the revised provisions of § 1
of the 1871 Act the following year.
209. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 44.
210. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 631-32 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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in the federal courts, the drafters insisted.211
The comment also indicates the drafters' concern with the contem-
porary legal context in which they operated.212 It is inconceivable that
in their continuing work of revision, they should not have considered
the implications of Slaughter-House. Their jurisdictional grant to the
Supreme Court is consonant with this hypothesis. It not only grants the
Court power to review actions for violations of "any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution," but also to review actions in-
volving violations of "any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States." This is word-for-word the language of the Slaughter-House
decision.213
B. The Revision of the Federal Statutes
The intended purpose and proper scope of the general statutory
revision of the Reconstruction era has been a major point of contro-
versy in the debate over the legislative history of section 1983.214 It
seems relevant to consider Congress' overall purpose in undertaking
the revision. Although the stated purposes of the revision included
consolidating and condensing the statutes, 215 this strengthening of fed-
eral laws must be seen as merely one aspect of the strengthening of the
central governmental authority that attended the union victory. The
1866 Act authorizing the revision thus instructed the revision commis-
sion to "revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate all statutes of the
United States, general and permanent in their nature" and mandated
that the commissioners "mak[e] such alterations as may be necessary to
reconcile the contradictions, supply the omissions, and amend the im-
211. 1 HOUSE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE LAWS, 42D CONG., REVISION OF THE UNITED
STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE
362 (Comm. Print 1872).
212. The Supreme Court has recently held that the contemporary legal context should be
taken into account when interpreting legislation. "In sum, it is not only appropriate but also
realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important
precedents from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be inter-
preted in conformity with them." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699
(1979). It is reasonable to assume that this logic would apply with even greater force to the
legal scholars involved in revising the statutes.
213. Justice Powell states that this provision "is not easily read to encompass rights se-
cured by any federal law," Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 16 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting),
but he provides no support for this assertion.
214. See, e.g., the majority opinion in Thiboutot which states in reference to this issue
that "Justice Powell's argument proceeds on the basis of the flawed premise that Congress
did not intend to change the meaning of existing laws when it revised the statutes." 448 U.S.
at 8 n.5. Powell counters with the statement that "it is the Court's premise that is flawed."
Id at 17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
215. See 2 CONG. Rc. 825-26 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Lawrence).
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perfections of the original text." '216 Congress understood this to mean
that "[t]hey were authorized to report amendments where there were
doubtful provisions, or where the law could be made better by some-
thing which should not in their judgment substantially change it, or
where through inadvertence the intent of the law had not perhaps been
carried out in its enactment."
21 7
The commissioners worked prodigiously beginning in 1866, and
the statute authorizing their work was renewed upon expiration in
1870.218 The final draft contained the many changes that they were
authorized to make.219 As the revision was nearing completion in 1873,
however, the revisers and members of the congressional committees in-
volved naturally started to focus on the political problems of securing
its passage through Congress. Some statements before the House by
Representative Poland, chairman of the House Committee on Revision
of the Laws, are quite revealing:
I take it for granted, Mr. Speaker, that every gentleman here feels
the same anxiety that is felt by members of the committee, that
after so much time and labor have been spent upon this work, it
should be brought to a successful termination. . . . IT]he Com-
mittee on Revision of Laws at the last Congress came to the con-
clusion that within the limited time that could be allowed for the
work in this House, it would be utterly impossible to carry the
measure through, if it was understood that it contained new legis-
lation. . . . [T]herefore we expect, if this work shall be adopted
by Congress at all, it will be mainly upon their faith in the com-
missioners and in the committee which has it in charge.2
It is not surprising that it was the members of the committee who as-
sured, as Justice Powell persuasively quotes, that the work "embodies
the law as it is."22 11 Nevertheless, the fact remains that an enormous
number of changes were made, notwithstanding the "customary stout
assertions of the codifiers that they had merely clarified and reor-
ganized without changing substance.1
22 2
216. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, §§ 1-2, 14 Stat. 74.
217. 2 CONG. REc. 648 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Hoar, member of the House Comm. on
the Revision of the Laws). See also id at 646 (remarks of Rep. Poland) ("By the original
law of 1866, under which the commissioners were appointed, they were authorized to make
changes to some extent, of which liberty they availed themselves.").
218. Act of May 4, 1870, ch. 73, 16 Stat. 96.
219. See text accompanying notes 216-17 supra.
220. 2 CONG. REC. 646 (1874).
221. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 17 (Powell, J., dissenting); Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 623-30 (Powell, J., concurring).
222. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803 (1966) (holding that the revisions signifi-
cantly broadened the forerunner of 18 U.S.C. § 242).
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The procedure for having the House consider the revision was sub-
ject to considerable debate.223 The members of the House who were
primarily concerned about the revision were attorneys, and a sufficient
number of these members were needed to reach a quorum.2 4 As a
result, special evening sessions were held during which the revision re-
ceived careful attention by an audience composed largely of attorneys.
Occasionally, a member with specific interest or expertise in an area of
the law would lead the discussion, often quite sophisticated, of the rele-
vant revised statutes. It was in this context that Representative Law-
rence, in a remark that consumed four pages of the Congressional
Record, introduced and evaluated the revised Civil Rights Acts.225
Representative Lawrence discussed the three primary Civil Rights
Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1871,226 and the revised statutory provisions
implementing them. He quoted both the old and the new provisions
and discussed variations between the two. He noted that "the manner
in which the purposes of the several civil-rights statutes have been
translated into the words of the compiler. . . possibly may show verbal
modifications bordering on legislation. ' 227 Concluding his analysis,
Represehtative Lawrence stated, "It requires great care to compare and
examine the effect of all this, and it is possible that the new consoli-
dated section may operate differently from the three original sections in
a very few cases. But the change, if any, cannot be objectionable, but is
valuable as securing uniformity.
2 8
In light of this attention to detail, Congress was either fully aware
of the ramifications of changes in the language or willing to accept the
ambiguities implied. Given the historical context, it is hardly implausi-
ble that the Forty-third Congress should have meant what it said when
it created expansive federal liability for violation, under color of state
law, of federal statutes.22 9 Justice Powell's complaint that congres-
sional debate should have been more thorough seems more an exercise
in formalistic judicial fastidiousness than statutory interpretation.230
223. See generally 2 CONG. REc. 646-50, 824 (1874).
224. 2 CONG. REc. 825 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Eldredge). Representative Eldredge and
other members of the House were adamant that the revision only be considered if a quorum
of the House were present. Id
225.' 2 CONG. REc. 825-28 (1874).
226. See note 114 supra.
227. 2 CONG. REc. 827 (1874).
228. Id at 829.
229. The following year, this same Congress enacted the general federal question juris-
dictional statute. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 129, at 953-62.
230. See Justice Powel's remarks in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
at 638-39 (Powell, J., concurring).
Spring 1982] 4 1983: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
C. The Anomaly of Incongruence Between Sections 1983 and 1343
In Chapman, six justices of the Supreme Court held that section
1343(3) was, as its plain language indicates, restricted to cases "provid-
ing for the protection of civil rights." One year later, in a mirror image
of Chapman, six justices in 7hiboutot held that section 1983, as its plain
language indicates, extended to cases involving the deprivation of "the
Constitution and laws." The anomaly of this development was la-
mented by Justice Powell.231 Both sections derive from section 1 of the
1871 Act. As one section, they were necessarily coextensive. Neverthe-
less, different wording in the three jurisdictional and one remedial pro-
visions emerged. There are two plausible explanations for these
differences.
The first, suggested by Justice Powell, is mere inadvertence.
2 32 If
there was error in the revision, however, the evidence suggests that it
was of a quite different sort than that suggested by Justice Powell. In
light of the text of the various provisions, the revisers' marginal refer-
ences and. explanatory notes, the purposes of the revision, and the gen-
eral and specific historical context, it is the phrasing of section 629(16)
that appears to be the oversight.3 3 The marginal notations for both
section 563(12) and"section 629(16) are identical and state, "[s]uits to
redress deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws to
persons within its jurisdiction." 3 4 It is only the phrasing in section
629(16) that refers more restrictively to laws providing for equal rights;
the broader phrasing of section 563(12) is perfectly consistent with the
marginal note, the explanatory note, and section 1983. The phrasing of
section 629(16) is inconsistent with all of these, as well as with the Civil
Rights Act from which it is supposedly derived.235
The second explanation assumes that the revisers knew what they
were doing in employing the variations in phrasing. It was a central
aim of the revisers of the statutes to reorganize the statutes into "the
more systematic plan of a more minute topical arrangement." 6 The
revisers thus intentionally created different jurisdictional grants for
231. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232. The words of Justice Frankfurter support this possibility. "Strong post-war feelings
caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws relating to the
new political issues." United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74 (1951).
233. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 664-65 (White, J.,
concurring).
234. Rev. Stat. 111 (1874) (emphasis added).
235. This was pointed out by Justice White in his concurrence in Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 665-69.
236. 2 CONG. REc. 827 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Lawrence).
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each level of the federal court system and specifically tailored those
grants to the functions served by the respective courts.
The district courts were given the broadest grant. They have al-
ways been the mainstay of the federal court system-the court of first
instance, the trial court. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is the
court of last review-the ultimate interpreter and guarantor of national
citizenship. The jurisdictional grant to the Supreme Court reflected
this role.
The circuit courts were the weakest link in the structure that the
1789 Judiciary Act had created. 3 7 By the time of the Civil Rights Acts,
the circuit courts seemed to many to be a "more and more frequently
futile" element in the federal judicial system. 38 They were greatly cir-
cumscribed in 1891,239 and were finally abolished outright in 1911.240
It makes perfect sense that legal scholars of the revisers' sophistication
would have given the circuit courts the most restrictive jurisdiction.
2 41
Whether or not either of these two explanations for the differences
in phrasing between Revised Statute section 1979 and the jurisdictional
sections are adopted, the real mistake occurred in 1911 when a more
conservative Congress adopted the restrictive circuit court provision for
section 1343(3),24z eliminated a coextensive jurisdictional counterpart
for section 1983, and created the "inherent ilogic" 24 3 of incongruence
between section 1983 and section 1343(3).
D. Section 1983 and Federalism
At the time of its passage, section 1983 represented a radical
strengthening of the federal government in relation to the states. The
Court's recognition in Thiboutot of the section's intended scope does
not, however, in the 1980's, represent the "major new intrusion into
state sovereignty under the federal system" that Justice Powell sug-
237. While both the circuit courts and the district courts were given original jurisdiction
under the 1789 Act, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts was more restricted. HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 129, at 33-34. Moreover, although the circuit courts also had some
appellate jurisdiction, this was undermined by "the long-standing scandal of district judges
sitting in review of their own judgments." Id at 40.
238. Id at 37.
239. The Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
240. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
241. It also makes sense that the revisers would not state this as a purpose behind their
revisions.
242. See note 134 supra.
243. This is the phrase used by the majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 8 n.6, and
by Justice Powell, id at 20 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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gests.2 4 It merely offers a limited and conceptually sound basis for a
power of review that the Court has already exercised to a significant
degree.245
Justice Powell's warning that state and local officials will be para-
lyzed by fear of liability and harassed by litigation 246 seems disingenu-
ous.247 The Court has developed numerous limitations on section 1983.
First, individual officials are protected from liability by a good faith
immunity.248 Second, although municipalities liable for violations of
rights protected by section 1983249 can no longer avail themselves of a
good faith immunity,25 ° City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc.,251 de-
cided after Thiboutot, insured that they do not risk punitive damages
awards. As one commentator has suggested, the result is more likely to
be thoughtful concern on the part of local officials than paralysis.252
Justice Powell's assertion that the courts' dockets will be over-
whelmed is similarly hyperbolic. Suits of the sort endorsed by
Thiboutot have been the routine business of the federal courts for
years.253 The issue in Thiboutot was not whether or not to protect the
courts from new litigation but whether or not the federal courts would
close their doors to cases that are currently heard. 4 Furthermore, the
recent case of Parratt v. Taylor 255 insures that section 1983 review will
be available only for deprivations occurring as a result of "some estab-
lished state procedure."
256
Although the Thiboutot opinion will not create a revolution in fed-
eral-state relations, it does fly in the face of the Court's recent decisions
on the role of the private litigant in statutory enforcement.257 The ma-
jority declined to discuss the historical, structural, or policy factors that
244. Id at 33 (Powell, I., dissenting).
245. See note 109 supra.
246. 448 U.S. at 22-25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
247. See generally Jennings, supra note 4, at 560-64.
248. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967).
249. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
250. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
251. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
252. See Jennings, supra note 4, at 560-62.
253. See note 110 and accompanying text supra; Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5-6.
254. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
255. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
256. Id at 537. The ramifications of this holding are profound but regrettably are be-
yond the scope of this article. See Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor:. Opening and Closing the
Door on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545 (1982).
257. See text accompanying notes 69-112 supra. See generally Morrison, Rights Without
Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Businesss of Protecting
Federal Rights, 30 RUTGEPs L. RE. 841 (1977).
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distinguish the section 1983 cause of action from the implied right of
action;25 it did not analyze the nature of the obligations a state under-
takes when it participates in a federally funded program259 or when it
administers economic regulations in response to a federal mandate, nor
did it distinguish such obligations from those imposed on a private
party by federal regulation. In short, Yhiboutot was a decision that left
its own justification to the future. In doing so, it left determination of
its impact to the unguided discretion of a future Court majority.
IV. Pennhurst and Sea Clammers: Limitations on the Section
1983 Statutory Cause of Action
A. Pennhurst
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,260 the Court
did not reach the section 1983 issue, although it did, in its remand,
direct the lower court to determine whether or not there was a section
1983 cause of action. 261 The way it avoided the issue and the terms of
the remand gave a shape to the section 1983 statutory cause of action
that Thiboutot had failed to supply.
The plaintiff, Terri Lee Halderman, a mentally retarded minor,
filed suit on behalf of herself and other residents of Pennhurst school
and hospital,26 2 a facility for the developmentally disabled that was
owned and operated by the State of Pennsylvania. She alleged that
Pennhurst was a dangerous, unsanitary, and inhumane warehouse for
the developmentally disabled. 63 Its residents were physically abused,
unnecessarily drugged, and inadequately treated by the staff. The in-
stitution had no rehabilitation plan for its retarded patients, and resi-
dents of Pennhurst suffered physical, intellectual, and emotional
deterioration. 64 These facts were undisputed by the state
258. See notes 301-19 and accompanying text infra.
259. "When [federal] money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of wel-
fare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states .... " Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 423 (1969) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937)).
260. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
261. The Court discussed the § 1983 issue in Part IV of its opinion. 451 U.S. at 27. As
Justice Blackmun pointed- out in his dissent, however, the § 1983 issue was not technically
before the Court, and thus any discussion of it amounted to an advisory opinion. Id at 32
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For the decision on
remand, see Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981).
262. Additional organizations intervened as plaintiffs after Halderman filed suit, notably
the United States and the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens.
263. These facts are discussed in detail in the district court opinion. Halderman v. Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
264. Id at 1302-11.
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defendants.265
The district court held that the plaintiffs' rights under the Eighth
Amendment and the equal protection clause had been violated by the
conditions at Pennhurst.266 It ordered that a plan for the closing of
Pennhurst and for the placement of patients in adequate community
living arrangements be submitted to the court.267 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit upheld the district court's order.268 It based
its decision, however, on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act269 rather than on constitutional grounds.270 The
court held that the plaintiffs had an implied right of action under that
Act.
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist, commanding a
majority of the Court, began his analysis by making "a brief review of
the general structure of the Act."27' Section 6000(b)(1) of the Develop-
mentally Disabled Act describes the "overall purpose" of the Act as
assisting "the states to ensure that persons with developmental disabili-
ties receive the care, treatment and other services necessary to enable
them to achieve their maximum potential through a system which...
ensures the protection of the legal and human rights ofpersons with devel-
opmental disabilities.272 Section 6000(b)(2) lists the "specific pur-
poses" of the Act. One of these specific purposes is: "to make grants to
support a system in each State to protect the legal and human rights of
all persons with developmental disabilities. 273 Section 6010 contains a
number of "findings respecting the rights" of the developmentally dis-
265. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 7.
266. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1320-22 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
267. Id at 1326-29.
268. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (Supp. III 1979).
270. 612 F.2d at 97.
271. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 11.
272. 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
273. Id § 6000(b)(2)(E). Justice Rehnquist describes this section as merely one of "vari-
ous activities necessary to the provision of comprehensive services to the developmentally
disabled." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 12. Such a character-
ization of the section does not do it justice. It is difficult to see how a system designed to
protect the legal and human rights of the developmentally disabled is necessary in order to
provide them comprehensive services. To the contrary, the purpose set out as a:specific goal
in subsection (E) goes well beyond what is necessary merely to provide services.
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abled.27 4 Among these was a right to "appropriate treatment, services,
and habilitation for such disabilities." Section 6063 conditions the ap-
proval of funds under the Act on the approval by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services of a state plan that must, inter alia, contain
assurances that any program receiving assistance is protecting the
human rights of the disabled consistent with section 6010.275
274. Section 6010 states the following, in pertinent part: "Congress makes the following
findings respecting the rights of persons with developmental disabilities:
"(I) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment,
services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
"(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabil-
ities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and should
be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's liberty.
"(3) The Federal Government and the States both have obligation to assure that pub-
lic funds are not provided to any institutional or other residential program . . . that
(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs
of such persons; or (B) does not meet the following minimum standards [pertaining to diet,
medical and dental services, physical or chemical restraints, relative's visiting rights, fire and
safety precautions].
"(4) All programs. . . should meet standards which are designed to assure the most
favorable possible outcome for those served, and . . . assure that the facilities under such
programs provide for the humane care of the residents of the facilities, are sanitary, and
protect their rights ...
"The rights of persons with developmental disabilities described in findings made in
this section are in addition to any constitutional or other rights otherwise afforded to all
persons." 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Justice Rehnquist's presentation of § 6010 omits several important provisions of the
section. He neither quotes nor mentions subsection (4) supra. Most importantly, he initially
omits the concluding sentence, supra, which was expressly added by a Conference Commit-
tee as part of the 1978 amendments to the Act. These omissions are curious in light of the
fact that Justice Rehnquist makes § 6010 the central focus of his consideration of the statute.
After concluding his analysis of the Act, Justice Rehnquist does mention the final sentence
of§ 6010 in a footnote. He dismisses it as recognizing "that Congress only 'described' rights,
not created them." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 22 n.16.
275. 42 U.S.C. § 6063 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 6063 is too lengthy to quote in
full here. Section 6063(a) requires that "any State desiring to take advantage of [the Act]"
must have a state plan submitted to and approved by the secretary of Health and Human
Services. Section 6063(b) sets out conditions for approval of the state plan that occupy four
pages of the United States Code. The state plan must provide for the establishment of a
detailed state hierarchy to administer and evaluate the programs, § 6063(b)(1), and set out
specific objectives to be achieved under the plan, § 6063(b)(2). Section 6063(b)(3) requires
that federal funds provided under the plan supplement and not supplant any state or other
federal funds otherwise available. The plan must prioritize funding, § 6063(b)(4), to make
sure that a certain percentage of funds is allocated to particular services. Section 6063(b)(5)
requires that the plan meet specific regulations and standards, including many of those set
out in preceding sections of the Act. For example, § 6063(b)(5)(C) states, "The plan must
contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that the human rights of
all persons with developmental disabilities (especially those persons without familial protec-
tion) who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation under programs assisted under
this chapter will be protected consistent with section 6010 of this title (relating to rights of the
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Reviewing this statutory framework, Justice Rehnquist found that
section 6010, the Bill of Rights portion of the Act, created no enforcea-
ble rights on behalf of the developmentally disabled.27 6 Since no rights
existed, neither an implied right of action nor a section 1983 action to
enforce section 6010 could lie.
2 7 7
Justice Rehnquist based his determination that the Developmen-
tally Disabled Bill of Rights created no rights on the nature of the fed-
eral-state relationship created by the Act. Congress could have placed
absolute requirements on the states, he conceded, had it legislated pur-
suant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 278 but Congress
rarely legislates pursuant to that power, he asserted, without explicitly
saying it is doing SO.2 7 9 Inference of a section five action, according to
developmentally disabled)" 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(5)(C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (emphasis ad-
ded).
Section 6063(b)(5)(C) is particularly noteworthy because it contains the specific refer-
ence to § 6010 (see emphasis above) that was not in the original wording of its predecessor,
§ 6063(b)(24) of the 1975 Act. This reference to § 6010 was added during the 1978 amend-
ments to the Act. The remaining two subsections of § 6063 govern the procedures the Secre-
tary must follow in approving state plans, § 6063(c), and the disbursement of federal funds
under the plan, § 6063(d).
276. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 11.
277. While allegedly holding these issues open, Justice Rehnquist suggests these conclu-
sions. Id. at 11, 28 n.21.
278. Justice Rehnquist does suggest that the rights allegedly created by § 6010, namely, a
right to treatment in the least restrictive setting, go beyond what would be allowable as
"appropriate" legislation within the meaning of§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I1d at 16
n.12. The Third Circuit had found that § 6010 was within the "judicially declared...
limits of the fourteenth amendment." Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612
F.2d at 98. This issue is interesting because the Court determines the level of review in
examining legislation according to the nature of the constitutional power that authorizes
congressional legislation. Thus, enactments pursuant to § 5 may invoke closer scrutiny by
the Court compared with exercises of other powers. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
452-56 (1976). See generally Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80
COLUM. L. RaV. 1265, 1265-67 (1980). Of course, under the seminal case of Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court did hold that Congress, when exercising its § 5
power, can prohibit practices that the Court itself might uphold under the Constitution.
Nevertheless, these issues are not explored because the dissenting opinion in Pennhurst
agrees that § 6010 was not enacted pursuant to § 5. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. at 35 (White, J., dissenting).
279. 451 U.S. at 16-17. Justice Rehnquist cites no authority for this assertion, but merely
cites some examples of legislation that has expressly stated it was enacted pursuant to § 5.
Justice Rehnquist further distinguishes between legislation that prohibits certain kinds of
state conduct and legislation that imposes affirmative obligations on the states. Id The
distinction Justice Rehnquist attempts to make, however, is by no means clear. He cites the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 as an example of a statute "which simply prohibited
certain kinds of state conduct," id at 16, yet Title II of those amendments established uni-
form national rules for absentee voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections. These
rules directly imposed affirmative obligations on the states and, concomitantly, substantial
financial burdens as well. Although Justice Rehnquist does little to develop this distinction,
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Justice Rehnquist, is most unlikely when meeting the congressional
standard would require massive expenditure of state funds.280 Instead,
he held, Congress passed the Developmentally Disabled Act pursuant
to the spending power.281 Legislation pursuant to the spending power
imposes only contract-like obligations upon the state. The state must
knowingly and voluntarily undertake the obligations as conditions on
the receipt of the federal funds, and consequently, the obligations must
be unambiguously stated.282 Section 6010 did not appear to Justice
he goes on to argue, "The case for inferring intent [to legislate pursuant to § 5] is at its
weakest where, as here, the rights asserted impose affirmative obligations on the States to
fund certain services, since we may assume that Congress will not implicitly attempt to im-
pose massive financial obligations on the States." Id at 16-17 (emphasis in original). Not
only is the meaning of this statement unclear (in such a situation it is the source of the power
that would be implicit, not the obligations imposed on the states), it appears to have little
basis. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist cites absolutely no authority for this assertion and is evi-
dently attempting to create new law. Although it is difficult to criticize the logical basis for
this position, since Justice Rehnquist does not provide one, the factual basis, see note 280
infra, is far from definite and probably nonexistent.
280. 451 U.S. at 16-17. Justice Rehnquist claims repeatedly that § 6010 would "impose
massive financial obligations on the States." Justice White, however, states in dissent that
"there is no indication in the record before us that the cost of compliance with § 6010 would
be 'massive'. . . . At best, the cost of compliance with § 6010 is indeterminate." Id at 49
(White, J., dissenting). Indeed, the district court found that operation of a program that did
satisfy the § 6010 requirements would be significantly less expensive than the cost of facili-
ties like Pennhurst. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1312.
Justice Rehnquist never refers to this factual finding of the court below, let alone claim it is
wrong under a clearly erroneous standard of review.
That Justice Rehnquist is willing to make such a claim and overrule a lower court solely
on the basis of conjecture illustrates the fundamental problems inherent in his approach to
statutory rights in Pennhurst. See notes 335-37 and accompanying text infra. By treating the
question of whether or not the statute created the rights claimed by the plaintiff as a thresh-
old issue, Justice Rehnquist analyzes the question devoid of a factual context. His analysis is
then at a loss when he needs factual support.
281. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18.
282. Id at 17. As support for this proposition, Justice Rehnquist cites several cases that
in some respects discuss limits on the power of Congress to impose conditions on the states
pursuant to the spending power, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). The seminal case, Davis, how-
ever, provides no support for his proposition that conditions in a statute must meet a high
standard of clarity and knowing acceptance. Rather, Davis merely says that states may not
be coerced into accepting the conditions of a statute in violation of the 10th Amendment.
Id at 585. This issue, central to the Court's decision holding the mandatory taxation of the
Social Security Act's unemployment compensation provision constitutional in Davis, has
little, if anything, to do with the nature of the conditions of § 6010, since it is the meaning
and not the constitutionality of the latter provision that is in issue. Moreover, Justice Rehn-
quist's reliance on Davis for the proposition that the "legitimacy of Congress' power to legis-
late under the Spending Power. . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the 'contract,'" Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
at 17 (emphasis added), is entirely inappropriate on another count. Justice Cardozo in Davis
rested his decision in part on a careful distinction between statutes and contracts. Statutes
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Rehnquist to meet these standards.283 He admonished his colleagues
not to be deceived by the description of section 6010's standards as
"rights." They are merely state findings, he declared. These congres-
sional preferences,284 although useful to guide the Secretary in his re-
view of applications, are "too thin a reed" to support the rights and
obligations read into them by the court below.285
Despite the short shrift he gave to plaintiffs' rights under section
6010, Justice Rehnquist remanded the case to the court of appeals for
determination of whether or not an action would lie under section
1983.286 He recognized that the conditional section of the Act, section
6063(b)(5), placed some obligation on the state recipient.2 7  He in-
structed the lower court to consider on remand,288 however, exactly
are substantially different from contracts, held Justice Cardozo, because the conditions that
statutes impose may be readily altered. Moreover, joint federal-state programs are volunta-
rily entered into by the states. "We are to keep in mind steadily that the conditions [of the
Act] are not provisions of a contract, but terms of a statute, which may be altered or repealed
... . There is only a condition which the state is free at pleasure to disregard or to fulfill."
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 594-95.
283. Justice Rebnquist's mode of analysis in making this determination is noteworthy.
In assessing whether or not a statute may be construed to create rights, he first considers the
source of power pursuant to which the statute was enacted. See notes 278-81 supra. Justice
Rehnquist next establishes the standard of clarity which he thinks legislation enacted pursu-
ant to that source of power should meet. If he feels Congress has failed to meet this standard
of draftsmanship, then no rights are created. This is the analysis with which he disposed of
§ 6010.
284. One of the most obvious problems with Justice Rehnquist's mode of analysis is the
fact that it renders much legislation useless. Justice Rehnquist maintains, however, that
much legislation is merely "precatory," expressing innuendo and congressional preference
"though falling short of legislating its goals." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 451 U.S. at 19. See text accompanying notes 335-37 infra.
285. 451 U.S. at 19.
286. The issue was not before the Court, but Justice Rehnquist discussed it anyway. Id
at 28 n.21. On remand, the District Court for New Hampshire held that a § 1983 remedy
was not available under the Developmentally Disabled Act, stating that the Act provided an
exclusive remedy. The court did not find a private cause of action under § 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act. See Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981).
287. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 29-30. For a discussion
of § 6063, see note 275 supra.
288. Justice Rehnquist raised two additional questions to be considered on remand.
First, what form of relief would be proper to remedy the problem. Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested a termination of funds to the state, certainly a harsh remedy from the perspective of
the intended beneficiaries, Ze., the disabled citizens of Pennsylvania. Second, whether or not
P'ennhurst involved a "program assisted" under the Act, since the institution received no
funds directly under the Act. 451 U.S. at 27-28. Justice Blackmun pointed out in his concur-
rence that this latter suggestion would undermine the entire Act by allowing states to insu-
late substandard institutions and still indirectly receive funds. Id at 33 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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what rights were produced by statutorily required assurances. 289 Not-
ing that Justice Powell, in his dissent in Thiboutot, had suggested that a
section 1983 remedy would be foreclosed when the governing statute
contained an exclusive remedy,290 he suggested that the Secretary's op-
tion to terminate funding291 might be an exclusive remedy.
292
Both Justice Blackmun, in concurrence, and Justice White, in dis-
sent, took exception to the views of Justice Rehnquist on the remanded
issues. Justice Blackmun, although he condemned the Developmen-
tally Disabled Act as "confused and confusing" legislation, expressed
concern that the Court "avoid the odd and perhaps dangerous prece-
dent of ascribing no meaning to a congressional enactment. ' 29 3 In his
opinion, review of Pennhurst's conduct under the conditional funding
section, section 6063, but with reference to section 6010, was mandated
under the Act.294 "That private parties, the intended beneficiaries of
289. Id. at 27-30. Similar assurances in other legislation have provided the basis for
private rights of action in previous cases. E.g., Lowell v. Secretary of Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 446 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (action based on assurances required under
the Relocation Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976)); Lake Park Home Owners
Ass'n v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 443 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (also based on
the Relocation Assistance Act); Tenants & Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment v. De-
partment of Hous. & Urban Dev., 406 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (action based on
"satisfactory assurance" requirement in the Federal Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1445(c)
(1976)); Western Addition Community Org. v. Romney, 320 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1969)
(also based on 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1976)).
290. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 28. This suggestion by
Justices Rehnquist and Powell constitutes a fundamental limitation on the availability of the
§ 1983 remedy. This limitation, suggested here in Pennhurst, became the basis of the Court's
subsequent holding in Sea Clammers. See notes 310-12 infra. The merits of this limitation
are discussed in text accompanying notes 338-41 infra.
291. Section 6065 of the Act specifically directs the Secretary to withhold funds from
states that fail to comply with the provisions of § 6063, one of which requires that the state
plan satisfy § 6010. See note 275 supra.
292. Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that a § 6065 funding termination be an exclusive
remedy under this Act has much harsher implications than the subsequent application of the
exclusive remedy rationale in Sea Clammers. See notes 305-14 infra. In Sea Clammers,
plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of an easily accessible remedy permitting private en-
forcement actions. Under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance Act, however, no such
private remedy is available. As Justice White pointed out in dissent in Pennhurst, "[A] funds
cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to the supposed beneficiaries of the
Act." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 52 (White, J., dissenting)
(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 n.42 (1979)). Thus, the remedy
that Justice Rehnquist suggests not only injures the intended beneficiaries, thereby defeating
the purpose of the Act, but also is not a remedy accessible to the intended beneficiaries.
293. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 32 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring). See also note 284 supra; text accompanying notes 335-36 infra.
294. 451 U.S. at 32-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Presumably, judicial review would
evaluate the adequacy of the assurances required under § 6063. This has been the practice
in previous similar litigation. See note 280 supra.
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the Act, should have the power to enforce the modest legal content of
§ 6063," he noted, "would not be an unusual application of our prece-
dents, even for a legislative scheme that involves federal regulatory su-
pervision of state operations. 295
In his dissent, Justice White dismissed Justice Rehnquist's entire
analysis of section 6010. "As clearly as words can, § 6010(1) declares
that the developmentally disabled have the right to appropriate treat-
ment, services and habilitation. 296 Since, in his analysis, section 6010
creates rights, Justice White proceeded to the section 1983 issue. He
viewed Thiboutot as creating "a presumption that a federal statute cre-
ating federal rights may be enforced in a § 1983 action." 297 He ac-
cepted the concept of an exclusive remedy but insisted that section
1983's protections apply "'unless there is a clear indication in a partic-
ular statute that its remedial provisions are exclusive or that for various
other reasons a § 1983 action is inconsistent with congressional inten-
tion.' ",298 Justice White rejected the idea that the statutory scheme of
the Developmentally Disabled Act set up an exclusive remedy. The
Court, he argued, should not foreclose a remedy for those most affected
by the program, no matter what remedies the administrative agency
might theoretically have.2 99 Those beneficiaries, after all, would surely
not be benefited by the termination of funds3"° and can only protect
their interest through judicial action.
B. Sea Clammers
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association30 1 was announced later in the same term as Pennhurst. It
confirmed the suggestion in Pennhurst that a section 1983 statutory
cause of action will not lie when the governing statute provides its own
exclusive remedy. Like the Pennhurst decision, however, the Sea Clam-
295. 451 U.S. at 33 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1969)).
296. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 39 (White, J.,
dissenting).
297. Id at 51.
298. Id (White, J., dissenting) (citing his own concurrence in Chapman v. Houston Wel-
fare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 672 (1979)).
299. 451 U.S. at 52 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated, "As a general matter, it
is clear that the fact that a federal administrative agency has the power to oversee a coopera-
tive state-federal venture does not mean that Congress intended such oversight to be the
exclusive remedy for enforcing statutory rights. Id (White, J., dissenting).
300. Id See note 292 supra.
301. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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mers decision left open the question of how the courts are to determine
whether or not a particular statutory remedy is exclusive.
The Sea Clammers case was brought by associations of fishermen
and shellfish harvesters who claimed that their livelihood was being
destroyed by the discharge of sewage and sludge from communities in
the New York metropolitan area.3 °2 The associations alleged that the
Federal Environmental Protection Agency, the state environmental
agencies of New York and New Jersey, and the polluting counties, mu-
nicipalities, and sewer districts had all violated the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act (FWPCA)3°3 and the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA)3 4 by permitting the discharge.
Both the FWPCA3°5 and the MPRSA °6 permit private enforce-
ment actions. The citizen suit provisions of each, however, require that
notice be given to the EPA and the alleged violators prior to filing and
also provide for only prospective relief. The plaintiffs chose not to fol-
low the statutory procedures of the FWPCA and MPRSA. Instead,
they proceeded under a common law theory of nuisance and an im-
plied right of action theory, seeking $500 million in compensatory and
punitive damages. The district court granted dismissal of the action on
the basis of the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the procedural prereq-
uisites of the statutory citizen suit provisions. The Third Circuit
reversed.307
Pointing out that both statutes contained "savings clauses" that
preserved "any right which any person (or class of persons) may have
302. The plaintiffs alleged that the illegal discharge created a massive algae growth in the
Atlantic off the coasts of New York and New Jersey. When the algae blooms died, they
settled to the ocean floor, suffocating enormous amounts of marine life, including shellfish
and other ocean bottom dwellers.
303. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
304. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976).
305. The citizen suit provisions of the FWPCA permit suits under the Act by any private
citizen. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976). The provisions authorize only prospective relief, however,
and the citizen plaintiff first must give notice to the EPA, to the state, and to any alleged
violator. Section 1365(e) of the Act, the "savings clause," indicates that other remedies be-
sides the citizen suit provision are available. "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including
relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
306. The MPRSA contains citizen suit provisions, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1976), with limi-
tations similar to those under the FWPCA. Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA also contains a
"savings clause." "The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency)." Id § 1415(g)(5).
307. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980).
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under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief,"308 the Third Circuit
found that Congress had thereby expressed its intent to permit private
suits for the enforcement of the statutes.3 °9 On this basis, the Court
held that an implied right of action was available.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, reversed the Third Circuit.
The extensive remedial provisions of the FWPCA and the MPRSA, he
said, precluded implication of private rights of action.310 Savings
clauses, he argued, that were designed to preserve remedies available
under other laws, do not give the Court license to fashion additional
remedies under the statute itself. He also dismissed the common law
claim, citing the Court's ruling in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois311 that
the FWPCA and MPRSA preempted common law remedies.3 2
Although the argument had not been advanced below, the Court
also considered sua sponte whether or not violation of the Acts by gov-
ernmental bodies would be actionable under section 1983. Justice
Powell's answer was that no action would lie under section 1983. His
logic was precisely that which he used in finding no implied right of
action. The comprehensive judicial remedies under the FWPCA and
308. Id at 1227 & n.10.
309. Id at 1227. The court of appeals distinguished between the injunctive relief provi-
sions of the citizen suit sections of the acts, which it said were available to noninjured per-
sons acting as private attorneys general, and the damage relief sought by the plaintiffs based
on their actual injury. The latter, the court explained, would be available because of the
savings clause and the general federal question jurisdiction of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1976). This remedy would not be restricted by the notice requirements of the citizen
suit provisions.
310. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 13-
15. Citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), and Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Court invoked the "elemental canon of statu-
tory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a
court must be chary of reading others into it." 453 U.S. at 14-15. On this basis, Justice
Powell rejected the court of appeals' distinction between injured and noninjured plaintiffs.
The FWPCA, he pointed out, did in fact limit its citizen suit provisions to those "adversely
affected" by the violation of the Act. Id at 16. Although the MPRSA did not contain
similar limitations, the Court said, "we are not persuaded by this fact alone that Congress
affirmatively intended to imply the existence of a parallel private remedy, after setting out
expressly the manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations." Id at 17.
311. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
312. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clarnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 21-
22. In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 328, the Court had indicated that the
savings clause of the FWPCA applied only to the citizen suit provisions of the Act. The
clause, the Court said, "means only that the provision of such suit does not revoke other
remedies. It most assuredly cannot be read to mean that the Act as a whole does not sup-
plant formerly available federal common law action but only that the particular section
authorizing citizen suits does not do so." Id at 329.
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MPRSA precluded resort to an alternative remedy. 3  The existence of
these remedies, according to Justice Powell, "demonstrates not only
that Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but also
that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be avail-
able under [section] 1983."314
Justice Stevens, in dissent, took exception to the Court's approach
to the question of the statutory cause of action in general and to the
exclusion of the section 1983 remedy in particular. That approach, he
charged, was "out of step with the Court's own history and tradi-
tion. '315 Quoting from Texas & Pacfc Railway v. Rigsby,3"6 he re-
minded the Court of its long-standing presumption that wrongs may be
remedied:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages
from the party in default is implied, according to the doctrine of
the common law. . . . This is but an application of the maxim,
ubijus ibi remedium. 317
313. The Court did not explicitly cite the expressio unius maxim in its discussion of its
exclusive remedy doctrine. See notes 339-40 and accompanying text infra. Justice Powell
denied dissenting Justice Stevens' charge that this reasoning placed the burden upon the
plaintiff to demonstrate congressional intent with respect to a given substantive statute to
preserve the § 1983 remedy. 453 U.S. at 20-21 n.31. It is difficult to see how Justice Powell's
opinion can be interpreted as not placing the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate such a
congressional intent once the courts determine that express remedies within the substantive
act are "comprehensive." Thus, if the Court's interpretation of comprehensive is broad, the
difference between the exclusive remedy doctrine and the expresslo unius maxim is minimal.
314. 453 U.S. at 21. Justice Powell himself, at the conclusion of his discussion of
Thiboutot in Sea Clammers, seemed to recognize the danger of an overly broad interpreta-
tion of the comprehensiveness of remedies in his citation to Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,
23 (1980). Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at
21. In Carlson, the Court had recognized that the lack of punitive damages and other limita-
tions in the remedies provided under the Federal Tort Claims Act made the Act an inade-
quate replacement for a Bivens action. The remedy proclaimed in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), has served in many respects as the equivalent of§ 1983
where federal officers violate constitutional rights; thus, Justice Powell seems to admit that
inadequacies in a scheme of statutory remedies are relevant to the determination of whether
or not the remedy will be deemed "comprehensive."
315. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 25-
26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316. 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916).
317. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 23-
24 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens traced the lineage of this principle as far back
as Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall had stated, "[I]t is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or
action at law, whenever that right is invaded." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Turning to the majority's treatment of the exclusive remedy issue
in Sea Clammers, Justice Stevens argued that the Court had rested its
finding that the FWPCA and MPRSA precluded section 1983 relief on
nothing more than the fact that the statutes provide other express reme-
dies and do not mention section 1983.318 According to Justice Stevens,
this reasoning is fundamentally flawed. It places the burden on the
section 1983 plaintiff to show that Congress intended violations of the
substantive statute to be redressed in private section 1983 actions. The
correct formulation, Justice Stevens argued, would require a defendant
seeking to defeat a section 1983 action to show that Congress intended
to foreclose access to the section 1983 remedy.
319
Justice Stevens rejected the argument that the comprehensive rem-
edies provided under the FWPCA and MPRSA evidence a congres-
sional intent to exclude section 1983 remedies. The preservation of all
legal remedies otherwise available in the savings clauses of the two stat-
utes seemed to Justice Stevens to negate such an inference. Indeed, for
him, these sections were a clear expression of congressional intent that
the section 1983 action be preserved.
V. The Section 1983 Statutory Cause of Action After
Pennhurst and Sea Clammers
A. The Formalist Approach
In Sea Clammers, the Court summarized its dual test for finding a
statutory cause of action under section 1983: "(i) Whether Congress
[had] foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment
itself, and (ii) whether the statute at issue there was the kind that cre-
ated enforceable 'rights' under [section] 1983."320 These prerequisites
to the application of section 1983 to statutory violations are, in them-
selves, little more than tautological. Could a general remedial statute,
after all, provide a remedy where no rights had been violated or where
the underlying substantive statute excluded an alternative remedy?
The crucial question is how the Court will determine whether remedies
contained within a statute are exclusive or whether the statute itself
creates enforceable rights. Both Sea Clammers and Pennhurst ad-
dressed these questions with a formalistic mode of analysis that stressed
the negative implications to be drawn from the failure of the legislative
318. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 27-
30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. Id at 27-28 n.ll.
320. 453 U.S. at 19.
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language to meet the Court's own standards of logical rigor.321
In Sea Clammers, this formalism took the Court down a familiar
path. The Court found that the relevant statutes, the FWPCA and the
MPRSA, provided their own judicial remedies. Despite the statutes'
explicit savings clauses that preserved other rights of action, the Court
determined that Congress intended the statutory remedies to be com-
prehensive. If Congress had failed to make clear that it intended to
preserve causes of action that might refer to the substantive standards
contained in the statue itself, so much the worse for it. Lacking such a
clear statement of preservative intent, the Court presumed that no such
additional remedies had been preserved. This presumption against the
private cause of action exactly parallels the reasoning of the Court in
Transamerica.322 All that is lacking is explicit invocation of the expres-
sio unius maxim.
In Pennhurst, the Court's approach was more novel but no less
formalistic. The Court created a new threshold question in statutory
litigation: Does the statute create enforceable rights at all? To answer
this question, the Court resorted to two rules of statutory interpretation.
The first of these was a presumption that Congress does not exercise its
Fourteenth Amendment power without an explicit statement that it is
doing so. 323 The second principle was that compliance with explicit
federal policy is not required of states receiving federal funds unless the
authorizing statute contains a clear statement that the funds are condi-
tioned upon such compliance.324 It was upon a failure to satisfy these
rules of legislative drafting that the Court based its finding that Con-
gress had not intended the Developmentally Disabled Bill of Rights to
create rights.
It is hard to escape the notion that the Court stacked the deck
against private litigants and Congress in the Pennhurst and Sea Clam-
mers cases. In Pennhurst, in particular, the Court's negative inference
analysis seems less designed to interpret the congressional will than to
frustrate congressional zeal.325 While the case against a broad reading
321. See notes 278-79, 282-83 and accompanying text supra.
322. See notes 98-102 and accompanying text supra.
323. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 15-16. See note 279 and
accompanying text supra.
324. 451 U.S. at 16-17. See notes 282-83 and accompanying text supra.
325. Underlying both of the rules of legislative drafting that Justice Rehnquist employs
to avoid finding a congressional intent to create rights are suggestions of substantive limits
on congressional power. The scope of rights protected by the 14th Amendment itself may,
Justice Rehnquist hints, define the scope of the legislative power under § 5 of the Amend-
ment. 451 U.S. at 16 n.12. By the same token, he indicates that use of the spending power to
lay down an affirmative obligation for the states as a condition for receipt of funds involves
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of the savings clause in Sea Clammers may have been a bit stronger,
the Court's reasoning there, as well, seems to have been governed by a
determination to limit private litigation.
B. The Thiboutot Remedy and the Implied Right of Action: An
Institutional Comparison
It should hardly be surprising that the Court would show an anti-
plaintiff bias in its view of section 1983 statutory litigation. Since Can-
non, the Court has become quite frank in its hostility toward private
implied rights of action to enforce federal statutes.326 The section 1983
and implied right issues are parallel and in individual cases often over-
lap. Moreover, in Thiboutot and in subsequent cases, the Court has
failed to analyze the institutional considerations distinguishing the
Thiboutot remedy from the implied right. It is natural, therefore, that
the Court should have carried its bias against the one over into its view
of the other without modification.
The problem is that very different institutional considerations af-
fect the two issues. However one may view Justice Powell's critique of
the implied right of action in his Cannon dissent, it simply is not an
adequate basis for analysis of the section 1983 statutory action.
In Cannon, Justice Powell was able to make two telling criticisms
of judicial implication of private actions. First, he contended that im-
plication is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers.327
Since Congress alone is given responsibility for determination of the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, enlargement of that jurisdiction
through implication of causes of action that Congress itself has not seen
fit to provide usurps congressional power.328 Second, he argued that
judicial implication short-circuits the political process. The politics of
legislation, in Justice Powell's analysis, is a two-front struggle. The
"constitutional difficulties." Id at 17 n.13. It is consistent with the formalistic approach that
such major constitutional issues should be resolved through analysis of drafting technique
rather than on a substantive basis.
326. See notes 85-89 and accompanying text supra.
327. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 746-47.
328. Of course, jurisdiction over federal questions has been granted to the courts by 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Although any interpretation of the term "federal question" that ex-
panded its scope would, under Justice Powell's strict interpretation of the exclusive power of
Congress to assign jurisdiction, be offensive to the separation of powers, Justice Powell does
not shrink from this implication of his argument. To the contrary, he declares, "To the
extent an expansive interpretation of [section] 1331 permits federal courts to assume control
over disputes which Congress did not consign to the federal judicial process, it is subject to
the same criticisms of judicial implication of private actions discussed in the text." 441 U.S.
at 746 n.17.
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proponents of the regulation or program fight for both strong legisla-
tive standards and Draconian enforcement. The opponents may suffer
defeat on the legislative standards but may nonetheless rally enough
support to weaken the enforcement mechanism. Judicial implication,
Justice Powell contends, permits Congress to evade responsibility for
resolution of this conflict within its own halls. The affable legislators
can please the proponents of measures with the strongest of legislative
standards, satisfy the opponents of those measures with a nearly nonex-
istent enforcement mechanism, and be assured that the courts, through
implication of private right of action, will make the hard decisions on
how the law will really work. When this deference to the judiciary
occurs, judicial review becomes a substitute for the political decision-
making process. Justice Powell condemns this role for the courts and
condemns the implied right of action for encouraging deliberate legis-
lative vagueness.329
Justice Powell's critique of the implied right of action has little
relevance to the Yhiboutot remedy. First, the charge of judicial expan-
sion of its own power cannot be made against interpretation of a gen-
eral remedial statute such as section 1983. Here, Congress itself has
exercised its prerogative and has granted jurisdiction.33 0 If any inter-
pretation of section 1983 may be termed intrusive on the congressional
authority over federal jurisdiction, it is the overly restrictive one.
Second, the array of institutional actors and interests in the
Yhiboutot remedy is different from that in the implied right of action.
The primary focus of the implied right of action analysis, despite the
confusion caused byAmtrak, continues to be on actions against private
parties who have violated federal regulatory or criminal statutes. The
focus of the Yhiboutot remedy, on the other hand, is on the maladmin-
istration of federal, social, and economic programs by state and local
governments and officers. The nature of the responsibility legislation
imposes on private parties is significantly different from the responsi-
329. The realism of Justice Powell's analysis has been strongly challenged. One com-
mentator put it as follows: "In essence Justice Powell's opinion suggests that he may be
unfamiliar with the legislative process. He wants Congress to speak loudly and clearly
whenever it seeks to effectuate a'legislative objective. Although the implementation of this
practice would be desirable, it is unrealistic. Legislation is often ambiguous, not because
ambiguity is desirable, but because compromise, with the attendant loss of clarity, is re-
quired for passage of the legislation." Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under
FederalLaw, 55 NoTRE DAME LAW. 33, 41 (1979). To the extent that all legislative interpre-
tation is simply the application of the broad language of legislative compromise to precise
circumstances of individual action, it is difficult to see how any manifestation of this vital
judicial role would escape Justice Powel's indictment.
330. But see note 328 supra.
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bility that it imposes on governmental bodies. The private individual
must merely refrain from violation of the law, whereas governmental
bodies undertake a positive obligation to implement the legislative
policy.
Moreover, legislative vagueness, which the Court feels shortcuts
the political process and imposes unexpected burdens on private par-
ties, has a very different significance when the legislation creates joint
federal-state responsibilities. By the very structure of the legislation,
some political, as well as administrative, choices on implementation of
the legislative policy are left to the state or local government. The
state's implementation, however, is expected to conform to the national
policy embodied in the authorizing legislation. The question the judi-
ciary is called upon to answer is whether or not the local government,
in the discharge of its authority to implement, has strayed beyond the
statutory grant of discretion.
C. State-Federal Joint Programs: The Need for Judicial Oversight
Adjudication regarding compliance with statutes in which funds
and authority are granted to the states to implement a federal policy
involves a balancing of interests. On one side are the concerns that
prompt the delegation-usually either a congressional desire that the
regulatory standard or mechanism for delivery of the benefit be ad-
justed to local conditions or a desire to use an administrative apparatus
already in existence at the local level. The countervailing interest is the
need for substantial uniformity in the administration of federal benefits
programs.
Purely practical considerations require a degree of national uni-
formity. Excessive variety in regulation of economic activity can place
undue hardship on interstate commerce. In the alternative, the same
variety can lead to interstate bidding to attract industry through lax
implementation of federally mandated regulation. By the same token,
overly harsh administration of benefits programs can lead to interstate
emigration that might, from a state's point of view, seem an advanta-
geous way to export the needy. In all of these situations the principal
purpose of enacting national legislation is defeated by unsupervised
state or local administration.
In addition, simple equity may require substantial similarity in
state administration of federal programs designed to benefit individual
citizens. Through national legislation, Congress defines a benefit or
protection as desirable. State participation in the program may be
mandatory or voluntary, but once a state does participate, it seems in-
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tuitively fair that the citizens of one state receive a benefit at least com-
parable in quality or amount to that received in another. As Justice
Cardozo wrote in Helvering v. Davis, "When money is spent to promote
the general welfare, the concept of welfare or its opposite is shaped by
Congress, not the states."33'
Administrative remedies on a national level are often insufficient
to insure that state implementation conforms to national norms. 332 Ad-
ministrative oversight of the state programs may be hobbled by a
number of factors. First, the executive branch does not necessarily
have the will to carry out the congressional purpose. Second, a change
of administration or partisan split between the executive and legislative
branches can leave the administration hostile to the policy goals that
the legislation seeks to achieve. On a federal level, judicial review
under the APA is sufficient to insure that executive action conforms to
the law. Where programs are locally administered, however, an ad-
ministration uncommitted to the legislative policy can insure its defeat
through neglect-unless the programs are subject to judicial oversight.
Structural problems also inhibit administrative oversight of federal
social programs.333 These programs are funneled generally through
agencies or departments such as the Department of Education, the De-
partment of Labor, or the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, whose orientation is toward funding and policymaking. The
agencies have little capacity for quasi-judicial inquiry into the compli-
ance of the local governments with statutory requirements, and often
have no procedures for initiating such proceedings by the intended
beneficiaries of their funds.334 The agency often would have no re-
course, if they did find noncompliance, other than to reduce or to cut
331. 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937).
332. Justice Stevens underscored this problem in Cannon, in which he noted, "As the
Government itself points out in this case, Title IX not only does not provide such a mecha-
nism, but the complaint procedure adopted by HEW does not allow the complainant to
participate in the investigation or subsequent enforcement proceedings. Moreover, even if
those proceedings result in a finding of a violation, a resulting voluntary compliance agree-
ment need not include relief for the complainant. Furthermore, the agency may simply
decide not to investigate-a decision that often will be based on a lack of enforcement re-
sources, rather than on any conclusion on the merits of the complaint. In that case, if no
private remedy exists, the complainant is relegated to a suit under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act to compel the agency to investigate and cut off funds. But surely this alternative is
far more disruptive of HEW's efforts efficiently to allocate its enforcement resources under
Title IX than a private suit against the recipient of federal aid could ever be." Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 707 n.41 (citations omitted).
333. See generaly Boasbery and Hews, Washington Beat- Federal Grants and Due Pro-
cess, 6 URB. L. 399 (1974).
334. See note 332 supra.
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off the state program's funding, thus defeating the purpose of the un-
derlying statute in the very act of enforcing it.
335
In sum, the factors relevant to the Thiboutot remedy impose none
of the constraints on judicial intervention that Justice Powell perceived
in his analysis of the implied right of action-quite the contrary. There
is an unavoidable tension built into the basic structure of the joint
state-federal program-a tension between the desirability of local deci-
sionmaking and the need for national uniformity-that can only be ef-
fectively managed through judicial oversight.
D. The Scope of the Thiboutot Remedy: A Suggested Approach
If the Court accepts the legitimacy of the Thiboutot remedy, the
limitations Pennhurst and Sea Clammers have placed upon it should be
modified.
The question raised in Pennhurst, whether or not the underlying
statute creates enforceable rights, is not, in itself, a section 1983 issue. It
will turn on the Court's interpretation of each individual statute as well
as on the Court's view of the congressional power to legislate under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the spending
power. The latter topics are beyond the scope of this article.
The Court's determination to give threshold treatment to the ques-
tion of whether or not the statute creates rights does seem to be part of
the evolving law of the Thiboutot remedy, however. This approach is
troubling.336 It implies that nationally adopted legislative policy may
frequently turn out to be so much empty talk.337 The standard of re-
view is troubling as well. The distinction between legislating voluntary
and mandatory guidelines338 invites the judiciary to go through statutes
with a nitpicking eye for the drafting error that can render the legisla-
tion meaningless. Even the courts of the substantive due process era
did not enjoy such routine authority to frustrate legislative initiative.
An alternative approach to the threshold issue of whether or not
rights exist would simply be the standing test: Does the plaintiff's in-
335. Id.
336. The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210
(1981), illustrates the degree to which this approach can undermine Thiboutot. The court
determined that tenants of public housing could not enforce statutory requirements that low-
income housing be decent, safe, and sanitary. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). In
line with the Supreme Court's restriction of the implied right of action, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the National Housing Act provided no such right of action. Without shift-
ing its frame of analysis, the court reasoned from this conclusion that the statute provided no
rights at all. Therefore, there can be no action under § 1983. 664 F.2d at 1217-18.
337. See note 293 and accompanying text supra.
338. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 19.
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jury fall within the zone of interests the statute is designed to protect?
339
This test would permit a court to proceed quickly to the real issue in-
volved in the federal programs cases: Whether or not the administering
local governmental entity or officer exceeded the discretion granted by
the statute.
The exclusive remedy doctrine that the Court accepted in Sea
Clammers need not prove overly restrictive, so long as the Court distin-
guishes it from the expressio unius maxim. Expressio unius is a tool for
the construction of a single statute. It is based on the presumption that
congressional silence is purposeful. The maxim is a rule of judicial
restraint, in that it prevents the Court from filling apparent gaps in a
legislative scheme. The exclusive remedy doctrine, on the other hand,
deals with the coordination of two explicit remedial schemes created by
separate statutes. The doctrine provides for the implicit repeal of the
general remedy with respect to a substantive statute that itself creates
an exclusive remedy.340 The exclusive remedy doctrine, however, does
not permit a presumption against availability of the section 1983 rem-
edy. The Court has always looked upon implicit repeal with disfa-
vor.341 It will accept partial implicit repeal only where there is a clear
expression of the legislative intent to repeal or where the provisions of
the old and new statutes are too repugnant to be reconciled.342
It is not clear that the majority in Sea Clammers carefully distin-
guished between the expressio unius maxim and the exclusive remedy
doctrine. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, charged that the majority had
placed the burden on the plaintiff to show that Congress had intended
to preserve the section 1983 cause of action. Justice Stevens' description
of the standard for determining whether or not a statutorily provided
remedy was intended to be exclusive was, in any case, clearly the cor-
rect one:
339. See notes 42-56 and accompanying text supra.
340. See, e.g, Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United States Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971)
(general restrictions on labor injunctions in Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1976), implicitly overruled by specific prorision of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152
First (1976)).
341. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), in which the Court said,
"As we have had occasion recently to repeat, 'repeals by implication are disfavored,' and
this canon of construction applies with particular force when the asserted repealer would
remove a remedy otherwise available." Id at 752 (citing Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 133-36 (1974)).
342. See, e.g., Colorado Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),
in which the Court said, "'When there are statutes clearly defining the jurisdiction of the
courts, the force and effect of such provision should not be disturbed by a mere implication
flowing from subsequent legislation."' Id at 808 (quoting Rosencrans v. United States, 165
U.S. 257, 262 (1897)).
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Because the § 1983 plaintiff is invoking an express private rem-
edy that is, on its face, applicable any time a violation of a federal
statute is alleged . . . the burden is properly placed on the de-
fendant to show that Congress, in enacting the particular sub-
stantive statute at issue, intended an exception to the general rule
of § 1983. A defendant may carry that burden by identifying ex-
press statutory language or legislative history revealing Congress'
intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy, or by establishing that
Congress intended that the remedies provided in the substantive
statute itself be exclusive.
3 43
Conclusion
On its face, Maine v. Thiboutot appears to augur a revolution in
federal statutory jurisprudence. Over a hundred years after the passage
of the section, the Court has finally recognized that the broad language
of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 provides a comprehensive mechanism for pri-
vate enforcement of federally created statutory rights where such rights
are violated under color of state law. The seeming expansiveness of the
Thiboutot decision, however, may, on closer examination, prove to be
but another ironic twist in the history of section 1983, for Thiboutot
comes just as the Court is engaged in a sweeping reevaluation of the
judicial role in statutory enforcement.
Transamerica and other implied right of action cases have adopted
a formalistic analysis of the remedial provisions of federal statutes that
forecloses judicial enforcement of legislative standards in any terms be-
yond those strictly required by clear statutory language. These cases
have eliminated, for all practical purposes, a broader statutory remedy
than the one Thiboutot provides.
In .Pennhurst and Sea Clammers, this bias against the statutory
cause of action colors the Court's interpretation of the Thiboutot rem-
edy. It is therefore possible that the two limits the Court placed on the
Thiboutot remedy-that the substantive statute create enforceable
rights and that it not contain an exclusive remedy-may swallow
Thiboutot entirely. If the Court does abandon Thiboutot, however, it
will do so because it has failed to examine the historical and structural
justifications for the remedy.
Section 1983 itself expressed a congressional determination in the
wake of the Civil War to subordinate the states to the supremacy of the
Union. Contrary to Justice Powell's assertions, there is every reason to
believe that Congress fully perceived the implications of the literal lan-
343. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Claimmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 27-
28 n. I 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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guage of the section. In short, Congress intended that state and local
governments and officers be accountable for violations of federal
statutes.
The modem expansion of federally legislated and locally adminis-
tered social and economic programs requires that federal review of
state conduct be placed on a sound conceptual foundation. The demise
of the implied right of action and the subordination of the standing
inquiry have threatened to insulate local implementation of federal
programs from judicial review. Both the language and the history of
section 1983 compel its use as the vehicle for that review.
Even if the Court accepts the legitimacy of the Thiboutot remedy,
it will nonetheless have to face the issues raised in Pennhurst and Sea
Clammers. The Pennhurst question-whether or not enforceable rights
have been violated-should not generally be resolved as a threshold
issue. Where Congress has acted pursuant to its lawful powers, the
question of whether or not a local government has violated enforceable
rights should be examined on the merits. It should be framed in terms
of whether or not the local government, in light of the circumstances,
has exceeded the discretion it is granted under the statute.
The Sea Clammers issue-whether or not the substantive statute
creates an exclusive remedy-is a reasonable restriction on Thiboutot
so long as it is not confused with the expressio unius maxim. Althbugh
the Court used that maxim in the implied right of action cases to create
a presumption against judicial review, the presumption in the analysis
of the exclusive remedy issue must be the opposite. The section 1983
remedy must be presumed to be available unless there is clear evidence
that Congress intended to withdraw it.
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